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CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A SURVEY
OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
PETER S. SMEDRESMAN*
The risks and uncertainties inherent in any commercial transac-
tion will multiply dramatically if national frontiers are crossed. Even in
a simple sale of goods, international businessmen must deal with differ-
ent languages, currencies, commercial customs and legal systems.
Today, international transactions are often far more complex; the
simple sale is being overshadowed by sales of entire businesses, joint
marketing schemes, licensing arrangements and large scale devel-
opment projects. Long term duration, a high level of technology and
considerable capital investment are characteristic of such transactions.
Not infrequently, foreign governments or their organs are parties.
When disputes arise, litigation in foreign courts frequently in-
volves disadvantages such as unfamiliar procedures, necessity for
hiring local counsel and an often well founded apprehension of dis-
criminatory treatment. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that arbitration
has become the preferred technique for dispute settlement in interna-
tional trade.
Proponents of arbitration often point to its advantages of speed
and economy.2 These benefits may be illusory, because an obstructive
party can make expenses and wasted time accumulate in any dispute.
However, arbitration does have other unique advantages. Party ap-
pointed arbitrators are often experts in the commercial field involved in
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I. Holtzmann, Long-Term Multinational Disputes: A Challenge to Arbitration, 24
ARB. J. 234 (1969).
2. See, e.g., Domke, International Arbitration of Commercial Disputes, in PRo-
CEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PRIVATE INVESTMENT ABROAD 131 (1960).
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an arbitration, and thus may be more sensitive to the factual context of
the dispute than a judge would be. Procedure in arbitration is generally
more flexible than in a lawsuit, and the entire proceeding, including
award, is usually private. When the parties wish to maintain their
commercial relationship, as is often the case in long term transactions,
arbitration is less likely to disturb the framework of the arrangement
than full scale litigation. Furthermore, if a spirit of cooperation does
exist, arbitration will usually be quicker and more economical than a
lawsuit. Crucial in the international context, however, is the assurance
that arbitration offers some freedom from the concern that foreign law,
not to mention foreign courts, will not protect adequately a party's
rights. The United States Supreme Court recently observed that uncer-
tainty regarding applicable law
[w]ill almost inevitably exist with respect to any contract
touching two or more countries, each with its own substan-
tive laws and conflict of law rules. A contractual provision
specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be
litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost
indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness
and predictability essential to any international business
transaction. Furthermore, such a provision obviates the dan-
ger that a dispute under the agreement might be submitted to
a forum hostile to the interests of one of the parties or
unfamiliar with the problem area involved.3
Professor Lorenzen has pointed out that several conflict of laws
issues intersect with arbitration in bewildering combinations.4 The
thesis to be developed here will carry that observation one step further
and will suggest that conflicts techniques offer the most satisfactory
way to understand the more complex legal problems raised in interna-
tional commercial arbitration.
Specifically, this study will compare the developing issues within
the conflicts aspects of international commercial arbitration, principal-
ly in the United States and the United Kingdom, with further reference
to the International Chamber of Commerce (I.C.C.). The chronology
of arbitration will be the basis of the format, which will progress from
the arbitration agreement to the actual proceedings, and then into court
proceedings with respect to arbitration, such as actions to enforce the
agreement or to confirm the award. Substantive issues will be dis-
cussed where the conflicts issues cannot be fully appreciated without
3. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974).
4. Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration-International and Interstate Aspects, 43
YALE L.J. 716, 729 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Lorenzen].
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further background. Recent developments will be given prominence,
and finally, legal doctrine will be related to actual practice.
The present is a propitious time for study of the conflicts issues in
international commercial arbitration. The United Kingdom, historical-
ly the center for international arbitration, has at long last acceded to the
1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 5 The Convention raises a host of conflicts
problems, and this analysis will focus on the changes it institutes in
British practice and international arbitration generally. Furthermore,
the Convention is generating a body of case law in the United States
6
which is due for review and evaluation. This is a body of law which all
international commercial practitioners should examine and understand.
Finally, this article takes the position that arbitration is a useful
institution and should be encouraged as a matter of legal policy. The
purpose here, therefore, is not merely to analyze the conflicts aspects
of commercial arbitration, but to determine how conflicts rules may be
applied concretely to attain the particular benefits of this mode of
transnational dispute settlement.
I. THE LAW APPLICABLE IN ARBITRATION
When arbitration works smoothly, as it does in the vast majority
of cases, neither party seeks recourse to the courts. Yet, even when
judicial supervision is not invoked, conflict of laws problems abound
in arbitration which are often unappreciated both by the parties and by
the arbitrator.
A. The Distinction Between the Law Governing the Proceedings
and That Governing the Substance
Arbitration7 is a hybrid, a quasi-judicial procedure created by
contractual agreement. A threshold distinction must be made, there-
5. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
done June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter referred as the New York Con-
vention]. The New York Convention received the Royal assent on Feb. 25, 1975, and
entered into force on Dec. 27, 1975, 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 203. The enabling
legislation was the Arbitration Act of 1975. The New York Convention is generally
referred to in the United States literature and case law as the "U.N. Convention".
6. The Convention entered into force for the United States on December 29, 1970,
subject to declarations, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 751 U.N.T.S. 58. The
implementing legislation forms chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§§ 201-08 (1970 & Supp. 1976). For the legislative history, see S. REP. No. 91-702, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 91-702]; S. COMM. ON FOR. REL.,
CONVENTION ON FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 10, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1968).
7. Rosenthal's definition is concise:
1977
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fore, between the law governing the proceedings and the law employed
by the arbitrator in resolving the merits of the controversy. There are
conflicts aspects to both, and the former will be discussed first.
The distinction between the law governing the procedings and the
law applied to the merits has nothing to do with whether arbitration
agreements are a matter of "substance" or "procedure" for choice of
law purposes. Much commentary and case law in the United States
exists on this point,8 which was of some consequence when many
states had no arbitration statutes and adhered to the common law
revocability of arbitration agreements. 9 The commentary was critical
of the rule, which stemmed largely from an unfortunate decision of
Judge Cardozo 1° holding that arbitration statutes are part of the law of
remedies, and that the lex fori therefore would determine the revoca-
bility of arbitration agreements. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. " seems
to have disposed of the doctrine in United States law by holding, inter
alia, that arbitration is substantive for the purposes of choosing state or
federal law by federal courts sitting in diversity cases. In English law,
Voluntary arbitration is the process by which two parties to a dispute
agree to submit their differences to one or more impartial persons for a
decision which both parties agree to accept as binding between them.
Rosenthal, Arbitration in the Settlement of International Trade Disputes, 11 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 808, 810 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Rosenthal]. See also Sturges,
Arbitration-What Is It?, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031 (1960). The outstanding general
references on arbitration are RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION (18th ed. A. Walton ed. 1970)
(English law) [hereinafter cited as RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION], and M. DOMKE, THE LAW
AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1968) (United States law) [hereinafter cited
as DOMKE].
8. Heilman, Arbitration Agreements and the Conflicts of Laws, 38 YALE L.J. 617
(1929); Lorenzen, supra note 4; Stern, The Conflict of Laws in Commercial Arbitration,
17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 567 (1952); Note, Commercial Arbitration and the Conflict of
Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 902 (1956).
9. Kill v. Hollister, [1746] 1 Wils. 109; Thomson v. Charnock, [1799] 8 T.R. 139;
Mitchell v. Harris, [1793] 2 Ves. Jun. 129a; cf. Scott v. Avery, [1856] 5 H.L. Cas. 811,
[1843-60] All E.R. 1.
10. Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C.R. Co., 211 N.Y. 346, 352, 105 N.E. 653,655
(1914), followed in Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921),
and Gantt v. Felipe Y. Carlos Hurtado Cia Ltda., 297 N.Y. 433, 79 N.E.2d 815 (1948).
The Meacham dictum recently resurfaced in I.S. Joseph Co., Inc. v. Tonfic Aris &
Fils, 54 App. Div. 2d 664, 388 N.Y.S. 2d 1 (1976). There, a contract between Minnesota
and French-Lebanese firms called for delivery in Louisiana, with arbitration in New
York under New York law. The court ordered arbitration to proceed in New York
partially because New York had the most significant contact with the arbitration provi-
sion, which was correct, and partially on the basis of the Meacham rule, which was not
only gratuitous, but incorrect. The question in IS. Joseph appeared to be one of
jurisdiction, not choice of law.
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arbitration has long been considered substantive, rather than pro-
cedural. 
12
This rather simplistic doctrine can do little harm in the interna-
tional context, because all major trading nations and states of the
United States have arbitration statutes providing at least the minimal
requirements. These requirements essentially are validity and non-
revocability of arbitration agreements,' 3 stay of court proceedings
pending arbitration,' 4 and judicial enforcement of the award with
limited review, usually restricted to such issues as fraud, corruption or
partiality of the arbitrators, or inherent unfairness in the proceedings. 15
Beyond these, however, the statutes differ considerably, giving rise to
conflicts consequences both for the arbitrator and for the court hearing
an action with respect to an arbitration.
This statutory framework for regulating the arbitral process consti-
tutes, in conflicts terms, the "law of the proceedings", or "loi d'arbi-
trage". 16 The issues governed by the law of the proceedings vary with
the commentator consulted. One writer would include all aspects of
arbitration excluding formalities, capacity and arbitrability.17 Another
lists issues of the nationality of the award, the conflicts rules which
determine the resolution of the merits, including the law governing the
12. Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery, [1894] A.C. 202, 210, 213-14; RUSSELL ON
ARBITRATION, supra note 7, at 52-54.
13. U.S. Arbitration Act § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970); Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6,
c. 27, s. 1 at 442 [hereinafter cited as 1950 Arbitration Act]; N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & Rules §
7502 (McKinney 1949). State law in the United States on arbitration in this discussion
will be represented by New York law, which is the most highly developed state law
concerning arbitration.
14. U.S. Arbitration Act §§ 3, 4, 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (1970 & Supp. 1976); 1950
Arbitration Act, supra note 13, §§ 23, 26, 27; N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & Rules §§ 7503, 7510,
7511 (McKinney 1949).
15. Several compilations of the arbitration laws of various nations are available,
but none should be assumed to be either current or comprehensive. See 3 INTERNATION-
AL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Sanders ed. 1956-65) [hereinafter cited as Sanders];
Commercial Arbitration and the Law Throughout the World (I.C.C. 1964); Evans &
Ellis, International Commercial Arbitration, A Comparison of Legal Regimes, 8 TEXAS
INT'L L.J. 17 (1973). A valuable looseleaf compilation of arbitration statutes, treaties and
institutional rules is found in SCHMIrrHOFF, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(1974) [hereinafter cited as SCHMITrHOFF]. An excellent general treatment of the legal
issues peculiar to international contracts is G.R. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CON-
TRACTS-APPLICABLE LAW AND SET-rLEMENT OF DISPUTES (2 vol., 1974-75).
16. F.A. Mann uses the phrase "lex arbitri". See Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, LIBER AMERCORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 157 (Sanders ed.
1967) [hereinafter cited as Mann]. See also Wilner, Determining the Law Governing
Performance in International Commercial Arbitration: A Comparative Study, 19 RUT-
GERS L. REV. 646, 648-49 & n.6 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Wilner].
17. Lalive, Problemes Relatives a I'Arbitrage International Commercial, 120 REC.
DES COURS 573, 611 (1967-I) [hereinafter cited as Lalive].
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validity of the arbitral agreement and whether the arbitrator must apply
rules of law at all.18 Yet another author would include the validity of
the submission, creation and composition of the tribunal, applicable
conflicts rules, the procedure to be followed in arbitration and the
making and publishing of the award.' 9 These diverse catalogues are
overly inclusive, 20 and it is submitted that the law of the proceedings
should govern all aspects of procedure in arbitration, including the
conduct of the arbitrator, and crucially, the extent of judicial supervi-
sion of the arbitration. 21 A mere definition of the law of the proceed-
ings, however, accomplishes little; the significant questions are
whether the law of the proceedings has an independent existence for
conflicts purposes, and how useful it is as an analytic tool.
In a case involving the question of access to the courts, the House
of Lords answered the first question in the affirmative. In James Miller
& Partners, Ltd. v. Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. ,22 a
Scottish firm contracted, in Scotland and on an English standard form
contract, to carry out construction at an English firm's plant in Scot-
land. The agreement contained an arbitration clause, and when a
dispute arose, a Scottish arbitrator was appointed. The arbitration was
held in Scotland under Scottish procedures. The English party request-
ed that the arbitrator state an award in the form of a special case for
decision on a point of law by the English High Court, a procedure
available only under the English Arbitration Act. 23 The arbitrator
refused and subsequently decided in favor of the Scottish party.
18. Mezger, The Arbitrator and Private International Law, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ARBITRATION, 229, 233 (Domke ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as Mezger].
19. Mann, supra note 16, at 164.
20. In particular, on formalities, see text accompanying notes 310-14 infra; on the
arbitration agreement, see text accompanying notes 292-93 infra; on arbitrability, see
text accompanying note 315 infra; on capacity, see text accompanying notes 302-07
infra.
21. Thus, the author prefers the narrower formulations in A. DICEY & J. MORRIS,
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1068 (9th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as DICEY & MORRIS] (the
law of the proceedings governs how the arbitrators are appointed, the effect of failure to
do so, what law the arbitrators are to apply, and ways to challenge the proceedings), but
see DICEY & MORRIS note 24 infra. Wilner, supra note 16, at 649 discusses whether the
arbitrator must give reasons for his award, whether the award must be based upon
substantive rules of law, and the availability of judicial review of the award. See also
Schmitthoff, Defective Arbitration Clauses, [1975] J. Bus. L. 9, 21:
It includes three aspects, venue, procedure to be applied by the arbitral
tribunal, and the definition of a national court charged with supervision of the
arbitration and, in particular, with the decision whether the arbitral tribunal
has exceeded its jurisdiction or the arbitrators have misconducted themselves.
22. [1970] A.C. 583, rev'g [1969] 1 W.L.R. 337.
23. 1950 Arbitration Act, supra note 13, § 21. On the special case procedure, see
text accompanying notes 120-35 infra. It is now available in Scotland: Administration of
Vol. 7
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The English firm, undaunted, applied to the English court. The
Queen's Bench Master ordered the arbitrator to state the case, but was
reversed by the Queen's Bench; this, in turn, was reversed by the
Court of Appeal. The House of Lords held, finally and unanimously,
that the law governing the proceedings, including the right to have a
case stated, could differ from the law governing the merits of the
dispute, that is, the "proper law of the contract". By their conduct, the
parties had elected Scottish procedural law, even though a majority of
the House concluded that English law should determine the merits. In
so deciding, their Lordships relied in part on a passage from Dicey &
Morris, The Conflict of Laws, which was quoted as follows:
No case appears to have been reported in which the
parties either chose as the law governing the arbitration
proceedings a system of law other than the proper law of the
contract, or failed to exercise their power to choose the law
governing the arbitration altogether. It cannot be doubted
that the courts would give effect to the choice of a law other
than the proper law of the contract. Thus if the parties
agreed on an arbitration in Switzerland, it may be held that,
whereas English law governs the validity, interpretation and
effect of the arbitration clause as such (including the scope
of the arbitrator's jurisdiction), the proceedings are gov-
erned by Swiss law. It is also submitted that where the
parties have failed to choose the law governing the arbitra-
tion proceedings, those proceedings must be considered, at
any rate prima facie, as being governed by the law of the
country in which the arbitration is held, on the ground that it
is the country most closely connected with the proceed-
ings .24
Justice Act (Scotland), s.3 (1) (1972). It is curious that the House did not give more
prominence to the fact that under section 34 of the 1950 Act, the Act does not apply to
Scotland.
24. [1970] A.C. 583, 616, per Lord Wilberforce, citing A. DICEY & J. MORRIS, THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (8ti ed. 1967) 1047-48. The material in parenthesis appropriately was
deleted from the quotation by Viscount Dilhorne, [1970] A.C. at 612. See text accom-
panying notes 293-96 infra.
The ninth edition of DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 21, at 1066-67, contains some
significant changes. The material preceding the sentence beginning "It cannot be doubt-
ed .... "now reads:
It is, however, for the parties not only to choose the law which is to govern
their agreement to arbitrate, but also the law which is to govern the arbitration
proceedings. Normally the parties exercise this power by determining (ex-
pressly or by implication) the country in which the arbitration is to take place,
i.e., normally the proper law of the contract, which includes the agreement to
arbitrate, coincides with the choice of the law governing the arbitration pro-
ceedings.
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James Miller is sound to the extent it holds that by selecting a site for
an arbitration, the parties impliedly choose the law of that place to
govern the proceedings, even when the merits of the dispute are to be
resolved through the application of some other law.
That difficulties arise with the James Miller analysis became
evident in a recent decision of the Court of Appeal. In International
Tank and Pipe S.A.K. v. KuwaitAviation Fuelling Co. K.S.C. ,25 two
Kuwaiti firms had agreed that if any disputes should arise between
them, it would be resolved in the first instance by an engineer.
Thereafter, a party aggrieved by the engineer's decision could invoke
arbitration under International Chamber of Commerce rules within
ninety days. English law was to govern the contract. A dispute arose,
and the engineer reached a decision. The losing party, fearful of losing
the right to invoke arbitration pending settlement negotiations and
unsure of whether it had sufficiently communicated its intent to do so,
applied to the English courts for an extension of time under section 27
of the Arbitration Act, which specifically authorized a court, in its
discretion, to extend such a contractual time limit.
The basic issue was whether it was proper for the English courts
to interfere with this arbitration. Under I.C.C. rules, the law of
procedure was that chosen by the parties, "or failing such choice, the
rules of law of the country where the arbitrator holds the proceed-
ings." 26 The lower court, in effect, concluded that there was no "law
of the proceedings" determinable from the given facts, and that Eng-
lish law was apparently the only choice available. The Court of Appeal
properly viewed the problem as one of jurisdiction, but used a ques-
tionable rationale. Master of the Rolls Lord Denning viewed section 27
of the Act as "an additional statutory term written into the contract.' ,27
As such, he reasoned, "its interpretation, its application, and effect are
to be governed by English law," 28 citing James Miller and its quota-
tion from Dicey & Morris. By accepting this "additional term" as a
basis of jurisdiction, the court reversed the maxim qui elegit judicem
elegitjus. This rule has played a critical role in English conflicts law,
29
Instead of "the proceedings are governed by Swiss law," there now reads: "but the
arbitration proceedings (including the extent to which they are subject to judicial control)
will be governed by Swiss law." The last sentence has been strengthened to read: "those
proceedings will almost certainly be governed by the law of the country in which the
arbitration is held ..... " citing James Miller for this proposition.
25. [1975] 1 Q.B. 224.
26. International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration,
art. 16 (1955), reprinted in SCHMIT-rHOFF, supra note 15.
27. [1975] 1 Q.B. at 233.
28. Id.
29. See text accompanying notes 160-68 infra.
Vol. 7
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and the significance of this reversal should not be belittled. Among
other things, the fact that English law governs a contract will support
extraterritorial service of process. 30 It is not surprising that the court
attached such importance to this factor even though there were no other
contacts with England.
Still, the opinion demonstrates some difficulties with the concept
of the law of the proceedings that the simpler facts in James Miller did
not suggest. At this stage in the proceedings, could such a law be
identified, let alone "chosen" in conflicts terms? Lord Denning, and
especially Lord Justice Browne 31 by characterizing the question as one
of contract interpretation, left open at least the theoretical possibility of
judicial supervision of the arbitration even after it commences in a
different country and under another judicial system. If more than one
court may properly assert supervisory jurisdiction over the same arbi-
tration, of what conceptual use is the "law of the proceeding"?
To answer this question, it must first be recognized that where a
transaction has multiple foreign contacts and involves parties of differ-
ent nationalities, litigation in several forums is inevitable. An arbitra-
tion agreement may be part of such a case, affecting only certain
parties and issues. The task of the national courts under these circum-
stances is to define the proper scope of their jurisdiction to affect
parties and proceedings beyond those where their jurisdiction is un-
questioned. This can be accomplished partly by due regard to contrac-
tual choice of forum and arbitration clauses which seek principally to
contain the litigational sprawl. The United States Supreme Court
recently touched on this point in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. ,32 in
which a United States multinational firm sought refuge in the United
States courts in the form of an injunction against an I.C.C. arbitration
on the ground that the subject matter of the dispute was not arbitrable
under United States law. The agreement selected Paris as the site of the
arbitration; thus, under the I.C.C. rules encountered in International
30. Rules of the Supreme Court, Ord. 11, R. I (1)(f)(iii). Both in The Sindh, [1975] 1
Lloyd's L.R. 372 (C.A.) and The Eleftheria, [1970] P. 94, [1969] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 237, the
proper law of the contract was taken into account in deciding whether to honor a choice
of forum clause. While Mann, supra note 16, at 164, indicates that a choice of substan-
tive law is not a choice of procedural law, there is nothing unreasonable in the observa-
tion that
in general, and other things being equal, it is more satisfactory for the law of a
foreign country to be decided by the courts of that country, especially since
questions of foreign law are reviewable only as fact questions in England.
The Eleftheria, 11969] 1 Lloyd's L.R. at 246.
31. [1975] 1 Q.B. at 234.
32. See note 3 supra.
1977
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Tank, the parties had selected a law of the proceedings. The Court
commented that refusal to respect the arbitration agreement
would invite unseemly and mutally destructive jockeying by
the parties to secure tactical litigation advantages. In the
present case, for example, it is not inconceivable that if
Scherk had anticipated that Alberto-Culver would be able in
this country to enjoin resort in arbitration he might have
sought an order in France or some other country enjoining
Alberto-Culver from proceeding with its litigation in the
United States. Whatever recognition the courts of this coun-
try might ultimately have granted to the order of the foreign
court, the dicey atmosphere of such a legal no-man's-land
would surely damage the fabric of international commerce
and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of busi-
nessmen to enter into international commercial
agreements.
33
Litigation involving foreign forums inevitably strains the en-
forcement authority of the courts. 34 Thus, even though the United
States Federal Arbitration Act authorizes courts to compel arbitra-
tion,35 the courts consistently have refused to order arbitration abroad,
but simply stayed their own proceedings pending foreign arbitration.
36
The United States legislation implementing the New York Convention
is significant in this respect. To facilitate use of the Convention
provisio mandating enforcement of arbitration agreements, the statute
provides:
A court having jurisdiction under this chapter may di-
rect that arbitration be held in accordance with the agree-
ment at any place therein provided for, whether that place is
within or without the United States. Such court may also
33. Id. at 279-80. The prime risk of participating in litigation in derogation of an
arbitration agreement in a forum friendly to the plaintiff is submission to the court's
jurisdiction, which will make any subsequent judgment, even by default, enforceable. A
recent illustration is Henry v. Geopresco International Ltd., [1975] 2 All E.R. 702 (C.A.).
But New York's statutory defenses to the conclusiveness of foreign money judgments
include that "the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between
the parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by
proceedings in that court." N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & Rules § 5304 (a)(6)(McKinney 1949).
34. See generally, DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 21, at 215-24; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 53, 54 (1971); Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in Interna-
tional Law, III REC. DES COURS 1, 127-50 (1964-I).
35. U.S. Arbitration Act § 3, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1970).
36. International Refugee Organization v. Republic S.S. Corp., 93 F. Supp. 798 (D.
Md. 1950); Danielsen v. Entre Rios Rys. Co., 22 F.2d 326 (D. Md. 1927). New York law
is similar: Application of Inter-Ocean Foods, Inc., 206 App. Div. 426, 201 N.Y.S. 536
(1923); Kelvin Engineering Co. v. Blanco, 125 Misc. 728, 210 N.Y.S. 10 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
See also A. EHRENZWEIG & E. JAYNE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 48, n.69 (1973).
Vol. 7
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appoint arbitrators in accordance with the provisions of the
agreement.
37
English courts exert extraterritorial jurisdiction generally only
"with extreme caution". 38 Under the 1950 Arbitration Act a court may
stay only its own proceedings 39 and the United Kingdom legislation
implementing the New York Convention does not change the result.
4 °
As a means of preventing obstruction and delay, such a stay is prob-
ably as effective as an affirmative order to arbitrate. A court willing to
order parties to arbitrate abroad should be at least equally willing to
restrain parties from pursuing litigation abroad in derogation of arbitra-
tion in the forum jurisdiction.4"
Jurisdiction in personam is a prerequisite to the exercise of ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction. A submission to arbitration is generally con-
sidered a submission to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of the
42site of the arbitration for purposes of enforcement of the agreement.
This did not appear to be a problem in International Tank; both parties
were before the court and the sole concern was the extraterritorial
reach of the court's enforcement jurisdiction. Instead of labelling the
issue one of contract interpretation, the court need only have con-
sidered the fact that English law governed the contract as a reasonable
basis for the exercise of that power. Because the same circumstance
would support jurisdiction in personam over nonresidents, personal
jurisdiction in International Tank followed a fortiori.
However, in personam jurisdiction was not present in another
case involving judicial interference with a foreign arbitration. In
Fotochrome Inc. v. Copal Co., Ltd. ,43 Fotochrome filed a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy while an arbitration proceeding was pending in
Tokyo between Fotochrome and a Japanese firm not subject to United
States jurisdiction. The referee in bankruptcy issued the standard stay
of all proceedings by creditors," which he interpreted to include the
arbitration. This determination was overruled by the United States
37. U.S. Arbitration Act § 206, 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1970 & Supp. 1976). The legislative
history notes that the relevant case law is "unclear". S. REP. No. 91-702, supra note 6,
at 8.
38. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 21, at 216.
39. 1970 Arbitration Act, supra note 13, § 4.
40. Arbitration Act, 1975, c. 3, § 1., see note 5 supra.
41. See, e.g., Gorthon Invest. AB v. Ford Motor Company Ltd., [1976] 2 Lloyd's
L.R. 720.
42. Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931); N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. &
Rules § 7501 (McKinney 1949); Rules of the Supreme Court Ord. 73, R. 7.
43. 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975), aff'g In re Fotochrome, 377 F. Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y.
1974).
44. Bankruptcy Act § 11 (a), 11 U.S.C. § 29 (a) (1970).
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district court on the grounds that the Bankruptcy Act has no extrater-
ritorial effect as such and that "[o]ur courts were bereft of any basis to
exercise in personam jurisdiction over Copal-much less the
[Japanese] Arbitration Association." 4 5 The United States court of
appeals affirmed this holding as "clearly correct' 46 although it de-
clined to speculate on the result if Copal were subject to the Bankrupt-
cy Court's jurisdiction.47
Some commentators, 8 particularly F.A. Mann, argue that since
procedural provisions like the Arbitration Acts can be applied only
within the territory, only the law of the seat of the arbitration can be the
law of the proceedings .49 Both premise and conclusion are somewhat
divorced from the reality of contemporary practice. International Tank
establishes that extrateritorial application of the Act is unobjectionable
if there is sufficient connection between the transaction and the forum,
or at least if both parties consent to such supervision. The law of the
proceedings certainly enjoys independent existence in the sense that
some court must have supervisory powers over the arbitration. Howev-
er, as Scherk suggests, determining the appropriate law will be dif-
ficult if the potential forums are more numerous than was the case
either in James Miller or in International Tank. Moreover, because
the issue is basically a jurisdictional one, the exercise of isolating a law
of the proceedings may not advance the court's analysis.
In arbitration, different courts may become involved at different
stages in the proceeding. This suggests a further difficulty with a strict
doctrine that only the law of the seat may be the law of the proceed-
ings: it may not be clear exactly where the "seat" is located. In
international arbitrations, the panel may convene in one place, meet in
others and render its award yet somewhere else. Significantly, in none
of Professor Mann's writings on this problem has he clearly defined
the "seat", although he does offer the suggestion that once a seat is
established, it remains with the arbitration. 50 He also suggests designat-
45. 377 F. Supp. 26, 29 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958).
46. 517 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1975).
47. Id. at 520. In Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 1973),
the issue of personal jurisdiction was also litigated, but not at the Supreme Court level.
48. See, e.g., Sauser-Hall, 1957 Amsterdam Resolution, 47 II ANNUAIRE DE L'IN-
STITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 479 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Sauser-Hall].
49. Mann, supra note 16, at 164, and especially, Comment, English Procedural
Law and Foreign Arbitration, 18 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 997, 999-1000 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as English Procedural law]. This article comments on the court of appeal decision
in James Miller.
50. English Procedural Law, supra note 49, at 1000. SCHMITTHOFF, supra note 15,
at 21, agrees, unless the parties adopt the law of the new venue.
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ing a seat in the agreement, 51 although Scherk demonstrates how
ineffective that might be in controlling litigation. Mann also finds the
choice easy when institutional arbitration is selected.52 However, if the
I.C.C. should order arbitration in London, the seat could hardly be
Paris, the I.C.C.'s location, even though Mann's analysis would
suggest this as the appropriate seat. Finally, the location of the arbitra-
tion may be fortuitous as simply that place where the chosen arbitrator
finds it most convenient to sit, and quite unconnected with the parties
or the underlying transaction. Clearly, the search for the seat of the
arbitration contributes little to a determination of the law of the pro-
ceedings in all but the relatively simple case.
Their Lordships' language in James Miller strongly suggests that
they considered the selection of procedural law largely a matter of the
choice, express or implied, of the parties. Because it was decided that
the law of the seat, Scotland, governed procedure, the court did not
face the question of whether the parties may select a law governing
procedure, including judicial supervision, other than that of the seat.
The problem is not so much one of the readiness of a foreign court to
assert jurisdiction, as one of the willingness of local courts to relin-
quish it. This prospect deserves analysis because the doctrine of party
autonomy for procedural law has been written into the New York
Convention. One of the grounds upon which a court may refuse
recognition and enforcement of an award is that
[t]he composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance
with the law of the country where the arbitration took place
53
The juxtaposition of the clauses makes it clear that the first clause
contemplates the possibility of a selection of procedural law different
from the law of the seat of the arbitration, which is left for residual
application. The moving force behind the Convention was the I.C.C.,
whose hope was that the United Nations Conference, which drafted the
Convention, would enshrine the "supranational" award, one free from
the multiplicity of national formal and procedural requirements, and
based entirely on the principle of the autonomy of the wills of the
parties. 54 More specifically, the Chamber argued that the 1923 Geneva
51. English Procedural Law, supra note 49.
52. Id.
53. New York Convention, supra note 5, article V (1) (d).
54. See Carabiber, Conditions on Development of International Commercial Arbi-
tration, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION, 149, 155-56 (Domke ed. 1958). An
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Protocol on Arbitration Clauses55 and the 1927 Geneva Convention on
the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 56 the forerunners of the
New York Convention, required arbitral procedure to comply with
both the agreement of the parties and with the procedural laws of the
seat. 7 The Chamber proposed what is essentially the present text in its
proposed draft Convention. 58 The ad hoc committee charged by the
Economic and Social Council with preparing a draft59 rejected the idea
of the "supranational" award, 60 but accepted the I.C.C. proposal with
the proviso that the parties could agree separately to procedural law
if such an agreement would be lawful where the arbitration were to
take place.61 This proviso was criticized by some governments and
organizations when the draft was circulated 62 and was omitted at the
Conference. The Italian delegate to the Working Party said at the
Conference that the clause
had been inserted on the understanding that the parties en-
joyed discretion only to the extent that they could select the
national law applicable in the matter. Consequently, the
Working Party's text should not be interpreted to mean that
the parties could agree to disregard all national laws and
determine some special procedure applicable to their case
alone.63
extensive defense of "supranational" arbitration is found in Goldman, Les Conflicts de
Lois dans L'Arbitrage International de Droit Privi, 109 REC. DES COURs 347 (1963-1I).
[hereinafter cited as Goldman].
55. Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, done Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 158,
U.K.T.S. No. 4 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Protocol].
56. Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done Sept. 26, 1927,
92 L.N.T.S. 302, U.K.T.S. No. 28 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention].
57. The Geneva Protocol, supra note 55, art. 2 para. 1, provides:
The arbitral procedure, including the constitution of the arbitral tribunal,
shall be governed by the will of the parties and by the law of the country in
whose territory the arbitration takes place.
The Geneva Convention, supra note 56, art. 2 para. 2, provides:
To obtain. . . recognition or enforcement, it shall. . . be necessary...
[tihat the award has been made by Arbitral Tribunal provided for in
the submission to arbitration or constituted in the manner agreed upon by the
parties and in conformity with the law governing the arbitration procedure.
See Mezger, supra note 18, at 236-37; Contini, International Commercial Arbitration, 8
AM. J. COMP. L. 283, 300-04 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Contini]; see generally, Mezger,
Zur Auslegung und Bewertung der Genfer Schiedsabkommen von 1923 und 1927, 24
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES PRIVATRECHT 222 (1959).
58. 17 U.N. ESCOR 18, U.N. Doc. E/C.2/373 (1954).
59. E.S.C. Res. 520, 18 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 7), U.N. Doc. E/2573/Add.1
(1954).
60. 19 U.N. ESCOR I1, U.N. Doc. E/2704 (1955).
61. ECOSOC Final Draft Convention, art. IV(g), 19 U.N. ESCOR 7, U.N. Doc.
E/2704 (1955).
62. 22 U.N. ESCOR 6, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/2, para. 13 (1958).
63. 22 U.N. ESCOR 10, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR. 17 at 10(1958). See, e.g., Pisar,
The Law Governing Arbitration, [1959] J. Bus. L. 342, 344, who appears to be incorrect
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However, because no court will employ foreign procedural law,
stipulation of foreign law to govern procedure is essentially stipulation
that a foreign forum will supervise the arbitration. For this to be
effective, the jurisdiction of the local courts must be excluded, and the
Convention seems to override the legality of such an ouster under local
law. Would the Convention, for instance, sanction the choice of New
York procedural law, under which there is no review on law, by parties
to an arbitration in London?
The answer to such a question seems to depend on whether the
local court follows civil law or common law doctrines. Mezger,
speaking from a civil law background, admits a "strong presumption"
that the law of the seat governs procedural matters, 64 but also asserts
that if a foreign procedural law has connections with the parties or the
dispute, "the states concerned have no interest in preventing parties
from selecting the procedural law of a legal system with which they
may have a regional or functional tie." 65 In fact, French case law
directly supports this view in the case of arbitrations held in Paris.
66
German statutory law permits German courts to assert jurisdiction over
an arbitration regardless of its location. 67 Nonetheless, it would not be
correct to regard these rules as clear authority for the proposition that
civil law permits a complete ouster of the local courts and procedural
law.
In common law countries, the question of whether an arbitration
is foreign or domestic is treated more as a territorial question, 68 and
extraterritorial jurisdiction is assumed only with reluctance.
Professor Nussbaum's fear that such differences in doctrine
would doom private law legislation by treaty69 has not been proved
well-founded, but nonetheless, the distinction certainly remains alive.
The United States Delegation's Report was critical of article V(1)(d) of
the Convention,70 noting the possible conflict with United States
in saying that the provision permits parties to designate procedure without reference to
any municipal law [hereinafter cited as Pisar].
64. Mezger, supra note 18, at 236.
65. Id. at 235.
66. Monier v. S.A.R.L. Scali Fr~res, Cour d'Appel de Paris, 5 Juillet 1955, noted in
45 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRiVE 79 (1956).
67. ZPO art. 1045.
68. On "foreign" and "domestic" awards, see text accompanying notes 227-28
infra.
69. Nussbaum, Treaties on Commercial Arbitration-A Test of International Pri-
vate Law Legislation, 56 HARV. L. REV. 219, 243 (1942).
70. Official Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Confer-
ence on International Commercial Arbitration (Washington D.C., 1958) 8-9.
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law. 7' The Convention does have a public policy escape clause 72 which
is likely to be the battleground on which the conflict over party
autonomy for procedural law will be waged. However, before this
conflict is approached, it is important that the underlying issues be
defined as sharply as possible.
Procedural law is by its nature mandatory; much of it consists of
nonwaivable safeguards for the parties' rights to be heard and present a
case. The international flavor of a transaction will not transform
mandatory rules into permissive ones.73 In arbitration statutes, aspects
which the parties are permitted to agree upon among themselves are
clearly set off as such.7 4 Party autonomy in procedural matters, as
Mann rightly emphasizes, therefore must either be permitted by the
local law or be nullified by it. 75 Furthermore, remnants of the "ous-
ter" doctrine, under which agreements to arbitrate future disputes even
within the forum were invalid and freely revocable,76 undoubtedly
linger in the courts. These, then, are the sources of the relevant public
policy attacks on the validity of an arbitral proceeding: violation of
mandatory procedural law and unlawful exclusion of the courts'
jurisdiction.
There is no doubt that attempts to remove arbitration from judicial
scrutiny raise public policy issues in the courts of England. Agree-
ments to preclude judicial review of arbitration on law are void under
English law, 77 and fears that the Convention would constrict supervi-
sion of purely domestic arbitrations helped to delay English accession
to the New York Convention for many years. The 1961 Fifth Report of
the Lord Chancellor's Private International Law Committee dealing
with the Convention 78 is not entirely enlightening on the effect of
71. Id. at 20. President Johnson's letter of transmittal to the Senate merely notes
that the provision recognizes the concept of the autonomy of the will of the parties as to
the choice of arbitration procedures. Message from the President of the United States,
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Exec.
Doc. E, 90th Cong. 2d Sess 21 (1968), 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1042-43 (1968).
72. See text accompanying notes 376-77 infra. Of course, the Convention is the lex
fori, but the presence of the public policy keeps the issue alive.
73. Szdszy, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 14 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 658, 667-68 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Szdszy].
74. But see Lalive, supra note 17, at 622, who disagrees.
75. Mann, supra note 16, at 164. Where Mann errs is too rigidly insisting that it
must be the seat of arbitration that provides this law. The point made in the text should
be valid whether one takes a "jurisdictional" or a "contractual" view of arbitration. On
this ancient and rather verbalistic battle, see Sauser-Hall, L'Arbitrage en droit interna-
tionale privi, 44 1 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 469, 516-28
(1952).
76. See note 9 supra.
77. Czarnikow v. Roth, Schmidt & Co., [19221 2 K.B. 478.
78. Private International Law Committee, Fifth Report, Cmnd. 1515 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Fifth Report].
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article V(1)(d). The Committee did not consider the provision "open
to objection", but did note as "relevant facts" 79 that
quite apart from questions of ouster, we attach importance
to the idea that arbitration is a procedure subject to law. This
does not, however, mean that every foreign system of law
requires its own provisions to be followed on pain of being
liable to be upset.80
Furthermore, the provision
appears to empower the parties to ignore the procedural
rules of the country of arbitration and to that extent to revive
the I.C.C. conception of an "international award", i.e. an
award completely independent of national laws;8' [but that]
[h]ead (a) of this paragraph, 2 however, requires the agree-
ment to be valid under some system of national law and
therefore preserves the conception of arbitration as a process
subject to law, while Article V(l)(e) clearly takes it for
granted that the powers of the competent authority in the
country where the arbitration takes place remain unim-
paired; and by virtue of Article V(2)(b) no Court in the
United Kingdom could be required to enforce a foreign
award that is contrary to the natural justice or to public
policy.8 3
Perhaps most significantly,
it seems that the Convention of 1958 cannot involve any
reduction in the control exercised by United Kingdom
Courts over arbitrators in the United Kingdom.'
The import of these passages is that judicial supervision of arbi-
tration within the United Kingdom is a matter for their own courts
notwithstanding any agreement, at least if the point involved is one
that, like review on law, touches English public policy. The language
in the James Miller decision indicating the procedural law may be
chosen by the parties, therefore, should not be extended too far from
the facts of that case. 85
79. Id. at 31.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See text accompanying notes 292-93 infra.
83. Fifth Report, supra note 78, at 31.
84. Id.
85. Accord, Kahn-Freund, Commercial Arbitration and the Conflict of Laws;
Recent Developments in England, 7 U. BR. COL. L. REV. 155, 169-70 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Kahn-Freund], and Kahn-Freund, La notion de la "proper law of the contract"
devant les juges et devant les arbitres, 62 REv. CRIT. DR. INT'L PRIVIi 607 (1973).
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Recently, the I.C.C. has been moving toward making the "supra-
national" award a reality. Formerly, I.C.C. arbitrators appear to have
accepted local procedural law, as required by article 16 of the Cham-
ber's 1955 rules. 86 Furthermore, the I.C.C.'s requirement of the draft-
ing of a formal submission prior to arbitration parallels the French
requirement of a "compromis". 87 The new 1975 I.C.C. rules, how-
ever, purport to free arbitrators from local procedural law. Article 11
provides:
The rules governing the proceedings before the arbitrator
shall be those resulting from these Rules and, where these
Rules are silent, any rules which the parties (or, failing them,
the arbitrator) may settle, and whether or not reference is
thereby made to a municipal procedural law to be applied to
the arbitration.
This raises the question of what the result would be if an arbitrator
were to use article 11 as a basis for violating some local rule relating to
arbitral procedure. In a current series of decisions in the New York
courts, the issue was addressed, albeit obliquely. Mobil Oil Indonesia,
Inc. v. Asamera Oil (Indonesia) Ltd.88 grew out of a 1968 contract
between two oil companies concerning the ownership rights to a
natural gas field in Indonesia. The contract contained an I.C.C. arbi-
tration clause, and New York was designated as the arbitration forum.
A dispute over royalties arose, and in December of 1974, Asam-
era invoked the arbitration provision. Thereafter, in July of 1975,
Asamera sought prehearing discovery, which was not provided for
either in the 1955 or the 1975 I.C.C. rules. Because arbitrators had no
power to order prehearing discovery without a court order 89 under both
New York and federal law, the threshold question was whether article
11 of the 1975 rules, which went into effect just prior to Asamera's
demand for discovery, applied. If not, the arbitrators would have had no
86. Chronique des sentences arbitrales, Cour d'Arbitrage de la Chambre de Com-
merce International, 101 J. DR. INT'L 876, 904-05 (Thomson & Derain eds. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as Chronique]. From the description in the Chronique, it is surmised
that this arbitration later appeared in the English courts as Dalmia Cement Ltd. v.
National Bank of Pakistan, [1975] 1 Q.B. 9, noted in 34 CAMS. L. J. 44 (1975), aff'd, The
Times, May 10, 1977, at 5, col. 1 (C.A.).
Subsequent Chroniques have appeared at 102 J. DU DR. INT'L 914 (1975), dealing
primarily with force majeure, and at 103 J. DU DR. INT'L 968 (1976), concentrating on the
formation of a general international commercial law.
87. C. PR. Civ. 1006; I.C.C. rules, art. 19.
88. 56 App. Div. 2d 339, 392 N.Y.S. 2d 614 (1977).
89. The lower court cited DeSapio v. Kolmeyer, 35 N.Y. 2d 402, 35 N.Y.S. 2d 843
(1974), and Commercial Solvents Corporation v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20
F.R.D. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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ground at all to override the local law. After hearing arguments, a two
to one majority of the arbitrators decided that the new rules, including
article 11, applied and they ordered discovery. The order was made in
the form of an interim award, which Mobil- brought to the New York
Supreme Court for review.
The court overturned the finding that the new rules applied,
vacated the arbitrators' order directing discovery, and directed that
arbitration proceed under the 1955 rules. The court's conclusion that
the earlier rules applied appears correct because both article 13 of the
1955 I.C.C. rules and article 8(1) of the 1975 rules provide that
agreements to arbitrate under I.C.C. rules refer to the rules in existence
at the time of agreement, which in this case was 1968. The dissenting
arbitrator, John Van Voorhis, a former judge of the New York Court of
Appeals, placed much weight on this provision in determining the
parties' intention. However, by concluding that the arbitrators "ex-
ceeded their power" by failing to follow the 1955 rules, the court
skirted the more difficult issue of whether the arbitrators had any
power at all to act contrary to New York procedural law under article
11.
The appellate division reversed the supreme court on the ground
that the arbitrators' initial decision in determining applicable rules was
not reviewable, using expansive language with respect to the review-
ability of arbitrators' procedural determinations. The court stated that
[o]nce it is determined that the parties agreed to have the
subject matter of a dispute submitted to arbitration, pro-
cedural questions which emerge and bear on the final dispo-
sition should be left to the arbitrators.
90
As a general standard, this surely is too broad. Had the arbitrators
decided to dispense with the right to cross-examine witnesses, or
restricted a party's right to submit relevant evidence, the court prob-
ably would not have used the same language. Yet, the result in Mobil
appears to be correct on its facts. In large scale institutional proceed-
ings similar to Mobil, some prehearing discovery may well be desir-
able, if not necessary.
The New York Convention, including article V(1)(d), did not
apply to the Mobil arbitration, since the award was rendered partially
in the United States. However, it would have been useful if the court
had discussed article V(1)(d) and established guidelines as to its scope.
Since the current direction of the case law is both to narrow the scope
90. Mobil Oil Indonesia, Inc. v. Asamera Oil (Indonesia) Ltd., 56 App. Div. 2d 339,
341, 392 N.Y.S. 2d 614, 616 (1977).
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of the public policy clause and to recognize the special requirements of
international arbitration, it may be that most modifications of local
procedural rules would be allowed if the rights of the parties were
adequately preserved. Generally, if derogation from local procedural
rules is permitted, it should be in particular cases bases on con-
sideration of the rule involved and the nature of the arbitration. For
instance, there-is a case for greater flexibility in I.C.C. arbitrations
when the locale of the arbitration is fortuitous or otherwise unrelated to
the merits of the case. Indeed, in James Miller, Lord Wilberforce
briefly entertained the thought that I.C.C. arbitrators might be freed
from local procedural requirements, although he added that concerning
other arbitrations in England, he "should be surprised if it had ever
been held that such arbitrations were not governed by the England
Arbitration Act in procedural matters, including the right to apply for a
case stated.' 91
Lord Wilberforce's suggestion that I.C.C. arbitrations might be
afforded greater procedural flexibility than others has been reinforced,
although only by implication, by a recent Court of Appeal decision. In
Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd. v. National Bank of Pakistan,92 an
Indian firm sought to hold a Pakistani bank to its guarantee of a series
of cement shipments. The underlying agreement contained an I.C.C.
arbitration clause, a stipulation of Indian law to govern the guarantee
and the arbitration, and a selection of the Indian courts as sole forum
for "all matters arising from or connected with this guarantee, and the
arbitration if any. "
The overlap of the arbitration and choice of forum clauses created
a significant problem of construction. The court solved it, without
explanation, by concluding that the parties had selected Indian law to
govern the procedural as well as the substantive issues involved in this
arbitration. The specific issue that arose here was indeed a procedural
one: whether the I.C.C. arbitrator had the authority to rule as to his
own jurisdiction. The court explained:
Any award against a person who was unwilling to obey it
could be enforced only by the machinery of some system of
law. Where, as here, a particular system of law was named in
91. [1970 A.C. at 616. One noted authority would also accept a departure from
local rules for institutional arbitration. SCHMITrHOFF, supra note 15, at 21. Because of
English judicial supervision of arbitration, the I.C.C. is said to be reluctant to order
arbitration in England. Cohn, The Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 132, 152 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Cohn]. Cf. N.V.
"Vulcaan" v. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi, [1938] 2 All E.R. 152 (H.L.) (statute of
limitations may be pleaded in arbitration).
92. The Times, May 10, 1977, at 5, col. 1.
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the arbitral agreement (Indian law) as governing the arbitra-
tion, it would normally be by reference to that system that
the question of enforcing the award would fall [sic] to be
considered. If and to the extent that the system did not
permit such wide jurisdiction to be given to the arbitrator,
then the effect of the rule would be limited accordingly. So
far as the rules themselves were concerned, on their true
construction they had the full width of giving to the arbi-
trator power to decide on his own jurisdiction in such a way
as to bind the parties; but subject always to any limitation
imposed by any relevant system of law which had to be
invoked for enforcing the award.
The Court of Appeal was much more aware than the court in
Mobil that the validity of the I.C.C. rules must be tested against the
governing arbitration statute. Indian law, as it develops, did not permit
an arbitrator to determine his own jurisdiction, although the court went
on to uphold the award. Thus, the Court accepted the choice of Indian
procedural law; ironically, however, it was applied against liberaliz-
ing the arbitral procedure!
The court's recognition of freedom to choose foreign procedural
law is limited by several features of the case. First, as the court noted,
English law appears to lead to the same conclusion. Second, the
Dalmia arbitration had little contact with England, and therefore with
the English Arbitration Act. Third, the issue of the arbitrator's power
to determine his own competence does not touch English public policy
as does, for instance, the availability of the case stated. Finally, I.C.C.
sponsorship of the arbitration guaranteed at least basic procedural
regularity. Thus, the Dalmia decision should not be taken to extend
English law on party selection of the law governing arbitrai procedure
beyond James Miller.
The use of foreign procedural provisions, even if permitted by
local public policy, can generate curious practical difficulties for the
arbitrator. For instance, should an English arbitrator sitting in France,
but subject to English procedural rules permit cross-examination of
witnesses? Similar difficulties will arise with other evidentiary rules
such as those regulating expert testimony and oaths, and will be
multiplied if the sessions are held in more than one country. Although
these problems are to some extent characteristic of all types of interna-
tional litigation, they would seem particularly destructive to the infor-
mal atmosphere of arbitration.
93
93. See generally Cohn, supra note 91. On evidentiary problems in international
commercial arbitration, see [Jan. 1975] ARBITRATION.
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One aspect of the legal controls on arbitration on which there is
little international agreement is whether the arbitrator must apply rules
of law to the merits of the dispute, or whether he may act as amiable
compositeur and render an award ex aequo et bono.94 In France95 and
under I.C.C. rules, 96 the parties may elect amiable composition. How-
ever, because all French awards must be reasoned, the risk of judicial
review on the merits is very high.97
In most United States jurisdictions98 the statutes are silent, and
amiable composition is almost the universal practice. Moreover, under
New York law, awards need not be reasoned99 and are immune from
review for errors of law.' 00 The federal courts, however, have engraft-
ed a judically created addition to the recognized statutory grounds for
refusing enforcement of awards for those made in "manifest disregard
of law".' 0 ' The boundaries of this doctrine are far from clear. An
egregious misconstruction of a contract will not suffice; 0 2 rather, what
seems to be required is a knowing failure to apply applicable manda-
tory law, such as regulatory legislation.' 03 Mere error is still generally
94. See generally Crane, Arbitral Freedom from Substantive Law, 14 ARB. J. 163
(1959); Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 519
(1960); Wilner, supra note 16, at 687-91; Note, Substantive Law in Arbitration Proceed-
ings, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 93 (1959); Note, Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards on the
Merits, 63 HARV. L. REV 681 (1950). For a comparative view, see Cohn, Commercial
Arbitration and the Rules of Law, 4 U. TOR. L. REV. 1 (1941).
95. C. PR. Civ., art. 1019.
96. I.C.C. Rules, art. 19 (3) reads:
The Court of Arbitration shall not give the arbitrator power to act as
"amiable compositeur" unless the parties agree thereto, and provided that it
will not in any way interfere with the legal enforcement of the award.
See also address by Fales, Arbitration of Private Business Disputes-The Draftsman's
Dilemma (1971) (available in the Eastman Library of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion) [hereinafter cited as Fales].
97. Zafiropulo v. Lambert, Cour d'Appel de Paris, 11 avril 1957 (amiable composi-
tion). But a foreign award without reasons will be confirmed; Broutchoux v. Elmassian,
Cour de cassation, J.C.P. IV (1960), noted in 88 J. DR. INT'L 168 (1961), and 59 REV.
CRIT. DR. INT'L PRIVii 393 (1960).
98. See DOMKE, supra note 7, at 258-59, 262.
99. Bay Ridge Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan, 22 App. Div. 2d 807,254 N.Y.S.
2d 616 (1964). On awards without reasons, see Domke, ArbitralAwards without Written
Opinions: Comparative Aspects of International Commercial Arbitration, in XXTH
CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTs LAW 249 (1961).
100. Fudickar v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392, 401 (1875); Aimcee
Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Products, 21 N.Y. 2d 621, 626, 237 N,E. 2d 223, 289 N.Y.S.
2d 968 (1965); Weinrott v. Carp, 32 N.Y. 2d 190, 344 N.Y.S. 2d 848 (1973).
101. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953); Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs
International Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1967); Amicizia Societa
Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate and Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1960).
102. I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1974).
103. See Berg, Manifest Disregard of Law and the United States Arbitration Act, 2
LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 129 (1975).
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nonreviewable, and is made nearly impossible by the widespread
practice by arbitrators of omitting the reasons for their awards.
Amiable composition in practice rarely amounts to a licensed
evasion of law in settling commercial disputes. One study in the
United States showed that eighty percent of the arbitrators surveyed
believed that they ought to reach their conclusions under accepted legal
doctrine, although ninety percent felt free to ignore the rules if adher-
ence would lead to an unjust result. "This result," adds the researcher,
"is curiously parallel to the attitude that seems to be implicit in our
appellate courts." 10 4 In France, it is reported that in ninety percent of
the cases where the parties elect amiable composition, they desire to
exclude appeal on the merits rather than bypass rules of law.
10 5
In view of the varieties of arbitration and the different motives of
parties taking advantage of it, it is not easy to generalize about the
proper role of law in arbitration. The figures just cited reflect a
consensus that rules of law should, and do, generally govern. On the
other hand, few would deny that there is a greater scope for extralegal
considerations such as trade usages, especially when the subject matter
is technical and the arbitrators are experts. In most commercial dis-
putes, the applicable rules would be those of contract law, which has
developed largely to reflect and protect the reasonable expectations of
businessmen. Thus, basic contract principles are likely to be applied
even by the nonlawyer.
10 6
It has been suggested that arbitration is most useful when applied
to
a dispute which is grounded not so much in the violation of
the letter of some rules or some law per se, as in the more
indistinct area of personal grievance and discord, [or] where
there is no adequate remedy at law or in equity.° 7
Professor Soia Mentschikoff adds that if it is important that the out-
come of a dispute be a guide for future conduct, or if a fundamental
legal point is at stake, the courts are better suited to resolve the dispute
than an arbitration tribunal. 10 8 However, these considerations have less
force in an international context. Since arbitration panels largely have
taken the place of the national courts in international commercial
104. Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 861 (1961).
105. Cohn, supra note 91, at 158 n.40.
106. Note, Predictability of Results in Commercial Arbitration, 61 HARV. L. REV.
1022, 1024-27 (1948).
107. Sirefman, In Search of a Theory of Arbitration, 15 ARB. J. 27, 34 (1960).
108. Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration-A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 698, 710 (1952).
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dispute settlement, they owe the parties the same duty to reach well
reasoned principled decisions. The use of substantive law, therefore, is
preferable in international arbitration.
09
The great body of international commercial law which has spread
from the English courts to many foreign courts owes much of its
existence to the institution of arbitration in London and to the judicial
encouragement which that institution has received. The general legal
setting of English arbitration is suggested by this passage from a recent
decision:
I think that arbitrators are nowadays probably much more
used to being addressed by lawyers than in the past. There is
now a close relationship and co-operation between specialist
arbitration tribunals and the Courts, in particular the Com-
mercial Court [, a division of the Queen's Bench set aside for
commercial and maritime matters]. This is also shown by the
fact that probably more than half of the work of the Com-
mercial Court arises out of references to arbitration and that
the new machinery set up by [section] 4 of the Administra-
tion of Justice Act, 1970, is beginning to be used whereby
Judges nominated to be Commercial [Court] Judges can ac-
cept appointment as sole arbitrators or umpires, subject to
the permission of the Lord Chief Justice. I have no doubt
that arbitration tribunals are now much more in touch with
legal developments in their specialist [sic] fields than in the
past. 110
The single greatest source of London's arbitration industry is the
use of English form contracts containing London arbitration clauses,
which are often used even where the transaction has no connection
with England. Many arbitrations are carried out under the auspices of
trade associations such as the London Corn Trade Association or the
Incorporated Oil Seed Association; they are often summary, informal
proceedings involving quality of goods disputes.'' The City of London
109. Mann, supra note 16, at 172, and Cohn, supra note 88, at 158, agree that use of
law is to be preferred to amiable composition. But this does not mean that arbitrators
must decide exactly as if they were judges. See text accompanying notes 170-78 infra.
110. The "Lysland", [1973] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 2%, 303 (C.A.), quoting from the
judgment of the Commercial Court, per Judge Kerr.
11l. Mackie, Commercial Arbitration in Commodity Trade, 3 LLOYDS MAR. &
COMM. L.Q. 278 (1967); see generally Ellenbogen, English Arbitration Practice, 17 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 656 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Ellenbogen], and Rosenthal, supra
note 7, at 820-31. The nature of grain arbitration may be changing from quality disputes
to legal tangles arising from chain colptracts. The London Grain and Feed Trade Associa-
tion, Ltd., heard approximately 1800 cases in 1975, double the number heard in 1973.
The main causes are attempts by parties to rescind contracts made before the drop in
Vol. 7
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is also the international center for maritime arbitration. These are often
elaborate, quasi-judicial proceedings where the rules of law are ob-
served strictly."l 2 Consultation with the courts is not uncommon. For
instance, the courts are consulted sometimes for an authoritative in-
terpretation of a clause in a form charter party. Considering the sums at
stake, the cost of these arbitrations often equal, or even exceed, the
cost of a lawsuit.
Although it has been decided recently that the courts have no
general supervisory power over arbitration, 113 the 1950 Arbitration Act
provides the courts with an arsenal of legal authority. The court may
break an arbitration agreement ,114 replace an appointed arbitrator with
an umpire, 115 appoint an arbitrator," 16 or remove an arbitrator for his
unreasonable delay 1 7 or misconduct. 118 However, the overriding con-
trol is that the arbitrator must resolve the controversy under rules of
law, a requirement that stems from the English judiciary's concern that
a body of commercial law might otherwise develop outside the
courts. 19 Consequently, an award with an error of law on its face is
likely to be remitted by the courts. 120 The principle means of judicial
review of arbitration of points on law, however, is the "case stated"
procedure employed in James Miller.
Section 21 of the 1950 Arbitration Act reads:
1) An arbitrator or umpire may, and shall if so directed by
the High Court, state-
a) any question of law arising in the course of the ref-
erence; or
b) an award or any part of an award in the form of a
special case for the decision of the High Court.
grain prices in 1975 and the limitation placed on soybean exports in 1973 by the United
States. International Herald Tribune, June 24, 1975, at 7, col. 1. Cf. Toepfer v. Cremer,
[1975] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 406 (Q.B.).
112. See Ellenbogen, supra note 11l, at 673-75, and Clark, Law and Arbitration as
Seen by the Maritime Arbitrator, [Jan. 1975] ARBITRATION I [hereinafter cited as Clark].
113. Exormisis Shipping S.A. v. Oonsoo, [1975] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 432 (Q.B.).
114. 1950 Arbitration Act, supra note 13, § 1.
115. Id. § 8(3).
116. Id. § 10.
117. Id. § 13.
118. Id. § 23(1).
119. "There must be no Alsatia in England where the King's writ does not run," per
Lord Justice Scrutton in Czarnikow v. Roth, Schmidt & Co., [1922] K.B. 478, 488;
accord, Orion Cia, Espafiola de Seguros v. Belfort Maats., [1962] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 257
(Q.B.).
120. 1950 Arbitration Act, supra note 13, § 22 (1). But if a specific question of law is
itself referred to arbitration, an error cannot be set aside by the courts. Absalom, Ltd. v.
Great Western Village Society, [1933] A.C. 592.
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2) A special case with respect to an interim award or with
respect to a question of law arising in the course of a ref-
erence may be stated, or may be directed by the High Court
to be stated, notwithstanding that proceedings under the
reference are still pending.
This provision cannot be evaded by agreement, 121 and a refusal by an
arbitrator to state a case may constitute misconduct for the purposes of
either remission of the award or removal of the arbitrator. 122 The recent
case of The "Lysland' 123 was devoted entirely to the circumstances
under which a case should be stated. While affirming that an arbitrator
has a measure of discretion in stating points of law, and that purely
factual questions should not be submitted to the courts, the Court of
Appeal rejected the efforts of the Queen's Bench Judge to formulate
guidelines for the procedure. Lord Denning, M.R., described three
basic criteria:
The point of law should be real and substantial and such
as to be open to serious argument and appropriate for deci-
sion by a court of law . . . as distinct from a point which is
dependent upon the special expertise of the arbitrator ....
The point of law should be clear cut and capable of
being accurately stated as a point of law-as distinct from
the dressing up of a matter of fact as if it were a point of law.
The point of law should be of such importance that the
resolution of it is necessary for the proper determination of
the case-as distinct from a side issue of little importance.1
24
Lord Justice Megaw approved the following summary by Justice Kerr:
If one takes the criteria set forward. . . that is to say, a
clear cut question of law which is seriously arguable, sub-
stantial in the sense of being important for the resolution of
the dispute and to the parties, and which is raised bona fide
and not merely for the purposes of delay, then I would
expect that in the great majority of cases in which those
criteria are satisfied, special cases will in the future, as in the
past, be stated on request or, if necessary, directed by the
Courts. 125
Justice Kerr is not alone in having recognized that the special case
technique is quite susceptible to abuse by obstructive or dilatory
121. Czarnikow v. Roth, Schmidt & Co., [1922] 2 K.B. 478.
122. Re Fischel & Mann, [1919] 2 K.B. 431.
123. The "Lysland", [19731 1 Lloyd's L.R. 296 (C.A.).
124. Id. at 306-07.
125. Id. at 309. The opinion is worth reading in its entirety.
Vol. 7
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parties. Lord Wilberforce's comment in Compagnie Tunisienne de
Navigation S.A. v. Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A. is particu-
larly pertinent here; he believed questions of the proper law of the
contract generally should not be reviewable above the Commercial
Court level except in unusual cases, since "the question is one of
estimating competing factors in the light of commercial intention."
1 26
Perhaps this adds little to what The "Lysland' ' 127 later established as
the requirements for invoking the special case procedure. On the other
hand, Lord Wilberforce might well have been suggesting that an
element of discretion and nonreviewability is present in the choice of
law process. If this is the case, conflict of laws problems may be less
welcome in the English courts when appealing from special cases.
In practice, the case stated is invoked infrequently; it has been
estimated at less than two percent overall 128 and almost always in
good faith. As such it has been useful as a source of maritime and
commercial law. Still, commentators have not been entirely friendly to
the institution, 129 and the statistics on United States arbitration, where
the technique has never taken root, indicate that it probably is not
necessary to guarantee the use of law by arbitrators. This would be
particularly true in England, where the use of law is traditional.
Finally, it must be remembered that if the case stated is not invoked,
review of law by the courts is usually frustrated by the nearly universal
practice by English arbitrators of not providing facts or reasons in the
award. 130
Once it has been determined that the arbitrator will reach his
decision using rules of law, he faces a problem that a judge never
confronts; he must ascertain which conflict of law rules should guide
his choice of the applicable law. The simplest answer is that the
arbitrator, like the judge, must apply the conflicts rules of the seat.
126. [1971] A.C. 572, 600, rev'g [1969] 1 W.L.R. 1338 (C.A.), noted in 12 HARV.
INT'L L. REV. 140 (1971) and by Kahn-Freund, supra note 85. See text accompanying
notes 160-68 infra. In The "Lysland", [1973] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 296, 310-11 (C.A.), this
comment was criticized by Lord Justice Megaw, who pointed out that if the choice of
law in Compagnie Tunisienne had not been reviewed, prior case law would still be the
rule. This is true, but Lord Wilberforce's remark remains perfectly applicable to post-
Compagnie Tunisienne litigation.
127. See note 110 supra.
128. Address by Cedric Barclay to the Institute of Arbitrators (July 26, 1975). The
rate is about 10% in maritime cases. Clark, supra note 112.
129. Cohn, supra note 91, at 152-53; SCHMITTHOFF, The Supervisory Jurisdiction of
the English Courts, noted in Sanders, supra note 15, at 289.
130. Lord Tangley, Introduction, International Arbitration, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
718 (1966). This circumstance indicates that amiable composition is more common in
English arbitration than the decisions suggest.
27
Smedresman: Conflict of Laws in International Commercial Arbitration: A Surve
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1977
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Mezger, who would grant parties autonomy in procedural matters,
rather surprisingly takes this view, as do others. 3 ' As an alternative,
the conflicts rules of the law which governs the contract have been
suggested. 1
3 2
The heart of the I.C.C.'s "anational arbitration" concept is that
international arbitration has no lex fori and that the conflicts rules of
the location of the proceedings have no paramount claim.' 33 In one
case involving Italian and Swiss parties, for instance, the latter party
proposed use of the "conflicts rules common to civilized nations",
while the former asked for the "cumulative application of those na-
tional conflicts rules interested in the litigation". The arbitrator ex-
amined the foreign contacts involved and decided on Italian conflicts
rules.' 34 In another dispute between Yugoslav and Iranian parties, the
arbitrator, an English barrister, sought the parties' presumed intent in
the absence of an explicit choice of law, citing both French and
English authorities for this approach. 1
35
Certain points should be made with regard to the selection of
choice of law rules. First, since the major systems of private interna-
tional law generally have similar rules for contracts, a specific selec-
tion of conflicts rules makes little difference. Indeed, it might be
claimed that a supranational conflicts law already exists. Second,
proof of foreign law is expensive, unreliable, and an example of the
sort of complication many parties hope to avoid by electing arbitration
instead of litigation. Even when arbitration is conducted under rules of
law, potential conflicts questions may never arise at all unless one
party demands the application of a favorable point of foreign law, or
unless the conflicts question is so pronounced that the arbitrator feels
compelled to use foreign law. 136 Even the I.C.C. arbitrators avoid
131. Mezger, supra note 18, at 239; Mann, supra note 16, at 167; Sauser-Hall, supra
note 75, at 571-72; Cohn, supra note 91, at 161-62.
132. Mann, supra note 16, at 167.
133. Chronique, supra note 86, at 886.
134. Id. at 884.
135. Id. at 890. On these techniques, see Goldman, supra note 54, at 250-414, who
emphasizes party autonomy; Lew, The Law Applicable to International Contracts as
Determined by Arbitration Tribunals in the Light of Disputes Before Them, VII JOUR-
NEES D'ETTUDES JEAN DABIN (1973) [hereinafter cited as Lew]; and Derain, L"Application
Cumulative des Lois Interisses au Litige, [1972] REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 99, and [19731
REV. ARB. 122.
136. In maritime arbitration, possible application of foreign law tends to arise only
with respect to certain issues. One such issue is damages, on which both Compagnie
Tunisienne, [1971] A.C. 572, and Tzortzis and Sykias v. Monark Lines A/B, [1968] 1
Lloyd's L.R. 337 (C.A.), arose. Another issue is who is the "carrier", the ship (English
rule) or the company issuing the bill of lading. A significant issue is the currency of the
contract, which is determined by the proper law of the agreement. Alan & Co. v. El Nasr
Vol. 7
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conflicts questions that are not directly brought to their attention. 137
Conflicts issues in practice rarely arise in England, even in arbitrations
with significant foreign contacts.'
38
When conflict of laws issues do arise, they are often significant.
Although private international law is relatively uniform, substantive
contract law differs, often radically, among different legal systems.
Finally, if the arbitrator is a lawyer, he is more likely to raise a
conflicts point sua sponte, especially in Europe.
139
B. The Law Applicable to the Merits
A general analysis of choice of law rules is, of course, beyond the
scope of this study. The discussion, therefore, will concentrate on
certain aspects peculiar to arbitration, and two in particular: the effect
of a choice of law clause in the agreement, and whether the arbitrator's
techniques should differ from those of the courts.
Choice of law clauses, along with arbitration and choice of forum
agreements, belong to the "boiler plate" sections of international
contracts. Unlike forum selection clauses, however, choice of law
clauses frequently appear together with arbitration clauses. It appears
that they are rarely the occasion for much planning or negotiation, and
lawyers are often rather dubious as to their efficacy in dispute settle-
ment. 140 One attorney has compared the security afforded by a choice
of law clause to "a roll of dice". 14" ' Of course, it is difficult to tell in
Export and Import Co., [1972] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 313; Jugosalvenska Oceanska Plovidba v.
Castle Investment Co., [1974] 2 Q.B. 292, noted in 33 CAMB. L.J. 12 (1974); cf.
Schorsch Meier v. Hennin, [1975] 1 Lloyd's L.R. I (C.A.). Other issues are repudiation
and the point at which a ship is said to arrive at its destination. Interview with Cedric
Barclay in Cambridge, England (July 26, 1975).
137. Chronique, supra note 86, at 910.
138. Interview with Michael Mustill, Q.C., in London (May 5, 1975) [hereinafter
cited as Interview with Michael Mustill, Q.C.I.
139. Fales, supra note 96. Furthermore, an advocate-arbitrator, which is common in
bipartite or tripartite arbitration, is more likely to raise a favorable point of foreign law
than a neutral arbitrator. Bipartite arbitration is not unusual in London practice; an
umpire is appointed only in case the two do not agree. Interview with Michael Mustill,
Q.C., supra note 138.
140. Lowe, Choice of Law Clauses in International Contracts: A Practical Ap-
proach, 12 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Lowe]. One suspects that the
same is too often true of arbitration clauses.
141. Panel, Choice of Law Problems and International Contracts, 1960 PROC. AM.
SOC. INT'L L. 48, 56. On drafting, see Folsom, Clauses in International Contracts
Involving Choice of Law, Language, Forum and Conflict Avoidance, in SYMPOSIUM ON
NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 41 (1966), and
MAW, CONFLICT AVOIDANCE IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS: CHOICE OF LAW AND LAN-
GUAGE (Reese ed., 1962). See also Vaughter, Choice of Law in International Contracts:
An American Critique, 2 TEX. INT'L L.J. 227 (1966).
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advance on what points of law a dispute will arise, especially because
this is to some extent a matter of legal ingenuity. Choice of law clauses
by themselves can therefore do little to manage future controversies.
Still, they are considered useful to reassure clients, or as a bargaining
concession in negotiation, especially if use of foreign law placates the
other party's sensibilities. Foreign law may even turn out to be more
favorable to a party than his own law.
An arbitration clause accompanied by a choice of law agreement
indicates that amiable composition is excluded 14 2 and that the arbi-
trators should apply that body of law 143 to the merits of the controver-
sy. 4 Of the English form contracts which provide so much of Lon-
don's arbitration business, those which designate a choice of law
universally select English law and, as a result, have no conflicts
consequences. Marine charter parties often provide that the law of the
flag of the ship will govern the agreement. Since these types of
arbitrations comprise the bulk of the English activity, it is relatively
unusual in English practice to find an express designation of non-
English law to govern the contract. Stipulations of foreign law are
more common in I.C.C. practice, where there is a greater diversity of
underlying transactions and no accepted universal seat for the proceed-
ings. 145
The legal validity of choice of law clauses is rarely at issue. In
one I.C.C. proceeding, the arbitrator rejected a party's contention that
142. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 346
U.S. 427 (1953); Fudickar v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392, 401 (1875).
143. Renvoi is generally excluded in contracts cases, especially where there is a
stipulation on governing law. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 21, at 723-24; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 186 (1971).
144. The "substance" or "merits" included such topics as performance generally,
discharge through force majeure, frustration or impossibility, liability for loss or damage
of goods, and agency problems. G. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 236-37 (9th
ed. 1974).
145. The arbitration clause in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), is
an example:
The parties agree that if any controversy or claim shall arise out of this
agreement or the breach thereof and either party shall request that the matter
shall be settled by arbitration, the matter shall be settled exclusively by
arbitration in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the International
Chamber of Commerce, Paris, France, by a single arbitrator, if the parties
shall agree upon one, or by one arbitrator appointed by each party and a third
arbitrator appointed by the other arbitrators. In case of any failure of a party
to make an appointment referred to above within four weeks after notice of
the controversy, such appointment shall be made by said Chamber. All arbitra-
tion proceedings shall be held in Paris, France, and each party agrees to
comply in all respects with any award made in any such proceedings and to the
entry of a judgment in any jurisdiction upon any award rendered in such
proceeding. The laws of the State of Illinois, U.S.A. shall apply to and govern
this agreement, its interpretation and performance.
Id. at 509 n.l.
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a choice of law clause must be valid under the law that "objectively"
governs the contract. 146 However, all courts place at least theoretical
limits on the validity of such agreements, whether that validity is tested
under the lex fori or the proper law of the contract. Arguably, the
former is the more appropriate standard, since the stipulation confines
the forum's choice of law inquiry. All major Western legal systems
give at least presumptive recognition to party autonomy. The intent of
the parties, express or implied, is the primary inquiry in English law
for determining the "proper law of the contract". 147 In the United
States, the deep seated aversion to "private legislation" is subsiding,
and both the Uniform Commercial Code 48 and the Second Restate-
ment of Conflicts of Laws149 support party autonomy.
The real test of party autonomy comes when the law designated is
neither that of the forum nor of either of the parties, or appears to have
been chosen to avoid some mandatory rule of the otherwise applicable
law. Largely as an outgrowth of the use of English form contracts,
English courts have long felt comfortable in honoring stipulations of
English law when the transaction has no other English contacts. One
commentator, however, has concluded that
[i]t remains an open question whether the English courts will
honor a stipulation of foreign law which didn't coincide with
English conflicts rules if the contacts between the contract
and the foreign law were as minimal as the cases where the
stipulated English law governed. 5 '
Limited reliance should be placed on the dictum in Vita Foods Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. ,151 which represented that connection
with England is not, in principle, necessary; dicta in the same case
maintains that the choice would be honored so long as it is bona fide,
legal and there is no reason for avoiding the choice on the ground of
public policy. 1
52
In the United States, the Uniform Commercial Code requires a
reasonable relationship between the stipulated law and the transac-
146. Chronique, supra note 86, at 907.
147. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 21, at 732.
148. U.C.C. § 1-105 (1972 version). See Rheinstein, Conflict of Laws in the U.C.C.,
16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 114 (1951).
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
150. Lowe, supra note 140, at 9.
151. Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., [1939] A.C. 277.
152. Id. at 290. The British courts are also likely to skim over a choice of law clause
if it would create an injustice. See In Re United Railways of the Havana and Regla
Warehouse Ltd., [1960] Ch. 52 (C.A.). Cf. The "Fehmarn", [1957] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 511
(C.A.) (choice of forum clause).
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tion. 153 The Restatement of Conflicts of Laws distinguishes between
those matters which could have been provided for explicitly in the
contract, as to which the parties are free to choose applicable law, and
those matters which the parties are not free to agree upon among
themselves, for which the choice will be valid as long as a reasonable
basis for the choice is present and there is no strong public policy
objection by a more interested state.1 54 This distinction illustrates that
contract law, unlike procedural law, is largely supplemental. As such,
contract law usually seeks to give effect to, and is subordinate to the
terms of the agreement.
The requirement of "reasonable connection" and the problem of
evasion are ultimately of little practical significance. The law chosen
will almost invariably be that of one of the parties. If not, some other
connection, such as the accepted use of highly developed English
maritime law, will be apparent. Any choice of law that is commercial-
ly reasonable is likely to be considered reasonable by a court.
There appears to be no logic dictating that an arbitrator should be
any less willing than a court to honor a stipulation of governing law.
The arbitrator, himself a creation of private agreement, might have
more of a tendency to be so inclined. Since the arbitrator does not
effectuate a state's interest as do the national courts, he has no reason
to consider a stipulation as a restriction on his choice of law powers.
The utility of a choice of law clause in an agreement is best
evaluated by examining the practice in situations where there is no
such agreement. When there is no effective choice by the parties, the
English courts seek to ascertain the "proper law" of the contract by
ascertaining the "system of law with which the transaction has its
closest and most real connection." 155 Much ink has been spilled in
153. U.C.C. § 1-105 (1972 version), and official comment. The cases seem to require
a territorial connection, and it is unwise to extrapolate this largely interstate body of law
into the international context. See, Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 341 (1975) and Lowe, supra note
140, at 17-20.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). Some of the
"noncontractables" would include substantial illegality, formalities and capacity. For a
discussion of relevant French and German law which share the same principles, see
Lowe, supra note 140, at 11-17. One recent federal district court decision, however,
refused to give effect to a stipulation of New York law where the parties were from
different states, the bulk of performance was overseas and the only contact with New
York was that one party retained counsel there. Fuller Co. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de-
Guinee, 421 F. Supp. 938 (W.D. Pa. 1976). The possibility that the parties may have
settled upon New York law by compromise or because it was well developed on some
significant aspect of the transaction was not considered by the court.
155. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 21, at 721; Bonython v. Commonwealth of
Australia, [1951] A.C. 201 (P.C.).
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trying to determine whether the courts follow the "subjective" ap-
proach by seeking to effectuate what the parties would have chosen
had they thought of the matter, or the "objective" analysis, whereby
the courts weigh the relevant factors and come to their own indepen-
dent conclusion.' 56 Recent cases suggest that the latter method is
currently favored by the English courts. The practice when the contract
is not clearly localized is most instructive. For instance, in the James
Miller case, a majority held that weight should be given to the use of
an English form contract, while the dissenters relied on the traditional
lex loci solutionis rule and favored Scottish law.' 57 In a more recent
case, Coast Lines Ltd. v. Hudig & Veder N. V. ,158 the Court of Appeal
relied on the rule of validation and the traditional rule that the national-
ity of the subject matter of a charter party determines the law govern-
ing the agreement. These decisions illustrate the traditional flexibility
of English conflicts doctrines, a flexibility which United States law has
attained only relatively recently. 1
59
Of particular relevance to a discussion of choice of laws by an
arbitrator is the line of English cases dealing with the effect of a
London arbitration clause on the proper law of the contract. Until
1970, the rule was clear that in the absence of agreement by the
parties, there was an almost irrebuttable presumption that, irrespective
of the nationality of the parties or the facts of the transaction, whoever
chooses London arbitration chooses English substantive law. 1. ° The
156. See, e.g., Cohn, The Objectivist Practice on the Proper Law of the Contract, 6
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 373 (1957).
157. Since their Lordships also concluded that the English courts had no juris-
diction, their decision on the proper law was, in effect, dicta.
158. [1972] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 53 (C.A.). The opinions contain a useful discussion of
conflicts analysis.
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(1) (1971) provides that in the
absence of an effective choice by the parties, the law of the state with "the most
significant relationship to the transaction and the parties" under the principles stated in
section 6 governs. The latter section lists general choice of law considerations, includ-
ing the needs of the interstate and international systems, the relevant policies of the
forum and of other interested states, the justified expectations of the parties, uniformity
and predictability, and ease in applying the law. Section 188 (2) lists particular contacts
for contract cases which include the place of contracting, negotiation, and performance,
as well as the location of the subject matter and the residence of the parties. Discussion
of interest analysis and other United States techniques is beyond the scope of this study
because United States arbitrators are rarely faced with explicit conflicts problems. The
leading cases include Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E. 2d 99 (1954); Bernkrant v.
Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906 (1961); Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1,395 P.2d
543 (1964); and Fricke v. Istbrandtsen Co., Inc., 151 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
160. Tzortzis and Sykias v. Monark Lines A/B, [1968] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 337 (C.A.);
Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery Co., [1894] A.C. 202; Norske Atlas Co., Ltd. v.
London General Ins. Co., Ltd., [1927] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 104; Maritime Ins. Co. v. As-
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rule in effect displaced the proper law inquiry. However, this placid
legal landscape was disturbed in 1970 with the decision of the House
of Lords in Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A. v. Compagnie
d'Armement Maritime S.A. 161
The facts were peculiar. A Tunisian firm negotiated a contract
with French shipowner, through a Paris broker and payable in francs,
to ship crude oil from one Tunisian port to another. An English
language charter party was used which provided that disputes would be
settled by arbitration in London and that the law of the ship's flag
would govern the agreement. However, instead of using a single ship,
the standard practice, ships of five different nationalities were used. It
appeared that the parties originally had intended that French ships
primarily would be used. A dispute arose, and the arbitrator stated a
case on the question of the proper law of the contract. The Court of
Appeal held English law to govern on the basis of Tzortzis and Sykias
v. Monark Lines A/B. 162
On appeal, the House of Lords had to evaluate the effect of both
the arbitration clause, and, in these curious circumstances, the choice
of law clause as well. As to the latter, their Lordships differed widely.
Lords Reid and Wilberforce found the clause meaningless in the
context, but Lords Morris and Diplock, and Viscount Dilhorne found
the clause an indication of choice of French law. Lord Morris also
concluded that the clause at least negatived an intention to choose
English law, an inference expressly rejected by Lord Wilberforce.
As to the arbitration clause, the House was unanimous in deciding
that the Court of Appeal had given it too much weight and that the
clause should have been considered as one factor among others in
determining the proper law. In other words, the same basic conflicts
analysis used by the courts should be used by arbitrators as well. Lord
Morris summarized as follows:
The circumstance that parties agree that any differences are
to be settled by arbitration in a certain country may and very
securanz Union von 1865, [1935] Lloyd's L.R. 16 (K.B.); N.V. Kwik Hoo Tong Handel
Maats. v. James Finlay & Co., Ltd., [1927] A.C. 604; N.V. "Vulcaan" v. A/S J. Ludwig
Mowinckels Rederi, [1938] 2 All E.R. 152; cf. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506 (1974):
Under some circumstances, the designation of arbitration in a certain
place might also be viewed as implicitly selecting the law of that place to apply
to that transaction. In this case, however, "[t]he laws of the State of Illinois"
were explicitly made applicable by the arbitration agreement.
417 U.S. at 519 n.13.
161. [1971] A.C. 572; See note 126 supra.
162. [1968] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 337 (C.A.).
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likely will lead to an inference that they intend the law of that
country to apply. But it is not a necessary inference or an
inevitable one, though it will often be the reasonable and
sensible one. Before drawing it, all the relevant circum-
stances are to be considered.
1 63
Similarly, Lord Wilberforce, after commenting that the language
in Tzortzis regarding the effect of the arbitration clause was "too
strong, too absolute,"' 64 added his view that
[n]either authority nor commercial reality supports the
necessity for so rigid a rule. An arbitration clause must be
treated as an indication, to be considered together with the
rest of the contract and relevant surrounding facts. Always it
will be a strong indication; often, especially where there are
parties of different nationality or a variety of transactions
which may arise under the contract, it will be the only clear
indication. But in some cases it must give way where other
indications are clear.'65
The contract in question, therefore, had its "most real and close
connection" with French law; their Lordships assumed that Tunisian
law did not differ materially from French.
Both Lord Morris and Lord Wilberforce carefully considered the
earlier cases and demonstrated that, with the exception of Tzortzis,
none had departed in principle from the basic proper law approach.
Thus, Compagnie Tunisienne is at least arguably consistent in theory,
if not in result, with the earlier cases, and is certainly consistent with
nonarbitration cases. For this reason, the decision has been praised by
commentators, who have generally rejected the rule that the seat of
arbitration determines the substantive law to be applied as well as the
procedural law. 1
66
Yet, in practice, it is often neither the seat of the proceedings nor
the nationality of the parties that determines the substantive law to be
applied; rather, it is the background and training of the arbitrator. Lord
Wilberforce stated that in choosing London arbitration, the parties
choose the expertise of city arbitrators and not their familiarity with
163. [1971] A.C. at 590.
164. Id. at 600.
165. Id.
166. Collins, Arbitration Clauses and Forum Selection Clauses in the Conflict of
Laws: Some Recent Developments in England, 2 J. MAR. L. & COM. 363 (1971); Sassoon,
Choice of Tribunal and the Proper Law of the Contract, [1964] J. Bus. L. 18; Kopel-
manas, The Settlement of Disputes in International Trade, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 384 (1961);
Lalive, supra note 17, at 613; contra, Sauser-Hall, supra note 75, and Mezger, supra
note 18, at 240; see also note 48 supra.
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English law. 167 However, English maritime and commercial law is so
highly developed that, in practice and notwithstanding the Compagnie
Tunisienne decision, it is quite unusual for English arbitrators to
deviate from English law.'
68
As a drafting matter, the fact that a London arbitration clause
continues to amount to a practical stipulation of English law as well,
suggests that additional choice of law stipulations are unnecessary. If
the parties have a particular reason to have foreign law govern the
contract, its application can be insured by appointing, or agreeing to
appoint, arbitrators versed in that law. If the parties are neutral on the
matter, it is undoubtedly best to designate only the venue of the
arbitration, leaving choice of law problems to the arbitrator's discre-
tion.' 69
A variant form of the choice of law clause which deserves men-
tion is that which directs arbitration to be held "under the English
Arbitration Act", or "under the arbitration laws of New York". By its
terms this is not a choice of substantive law, but a designation of the
law to govern the procedure. If the site of the arbitration is also
stipulated, a mere designation of procedural law is redundant, and such
a clause would suggest a choice of substantive law as well. Alterna-
tively, if the clause were to appear by itself, it would be a strong
indication of a choice of seat and perhaps a somewhat weaker indica-
tion of a selection of substantive law as well. Since their meaning is
unclear in any case, such clauses should be avoided.
167. [1971] A.C. at 596.
168. Arguably, Tzortzis unwisely elevated general practice to a rule of law which
was given flexibility by Compagnie Tunisienne. English arbitrators, of course, will honor
a choice of law clause. Interview with Cedric Barclay, supra note 136. Some arbitrators,
however, may rely on the presumption that foreign law is the same as domestic.
169. Interview with Michael Mustill, Q.C., supra note 138; SCHMiTrHOFF, supra
note 15, at 21; accord, Wilner, supra note 16, at 683.
Since the Geneva Protocol, supra note 55, the Geneva Convention, supra note 56,
and the New York Convention, supra note 6, address the courts and not the arbitrator, it
is not surprising that they do not deal with the issue of the arbitrator's choice of law to
govern the merits. One convention that does speak to this issue is the little used
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, done April 21, 1961,484
U.N.T.S. 364, noted by Robert, [1961] Rec. Dalloz 33; Klein, 51 REV. CRIT. DR. INT'L
PRIVE 621 (1962), and BENJAMIN, The European Convention on International Arbitra-
tion, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 478 (1961). Its article VII reads:
1. The parties shall be free to determine, by agreement, the law to be
applied by the arbitrators to the substance of the dispute. Failing any indica-
tion by the parties as to the applicable law, the arbitrators shall apply the
proper law under the rule of conflict that the arbitrators deem applicable. In
both cases the arbitrator shall take account of the terms of the contract and
trade usages.
484 U.N.T.S. at 374.
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It would be imprudent to generalize from available I.C.C.
awards, since the Chamber does not encourage its arbitrators to use
prior awards as precedents unless an I.C.C. rule is at issue.17 ° As is
true of many arbitration institutions, the Chamber's rules do not
provide guidance for choice of law issues. 17
I.C.C. arbitrators, however, do often consider themselves vested
with considerable latitude in choice of law matters. In some cases this
discretion has extended to what Goldman calls the "d6passement" of
conflict of laws, that is, avoiding choice of law altogether by applying
"anational law", the general principles of the law of international
commercial transactions. 172 Few would deny that such a body of law is
emerging, 173 and to a large extent it is an outgrowth of English
commercial and maritime principles. I.C.C. arbitrators rarely rely
solely on this ground as a basis for decision, preferring to demonstrate
how the national laws interested in the dispute also lead to the same
conclusion. 74 Of course, in contract cases, national laws can be
escaped by labelling an issue as one of contract construction. Trade
usage and custom clearly have an important role in this technique, and
indeed it may be difficult to maintain a precisely defined distinction
between law and custom. Several awards have shown an almost
striking regard for commerical practicalities. Thus, in one I.C.C.
proceeding involving a frustration problem, the arbitrator warned that
he would have more of an eye to commercial considerations than to
legalities, and that experienced international businessmen should be
held to the risks they take. 175 In a non-I.C.C. case also involving a
frustration issue, a Yugoslav arbitrator found no clear fault on either
side and simply divided the loss evenly between the parties. 176 In
another I.C.C. case, a government party was chided by the arbitrator
170. Chronique, supra note 86, at 878.
171. Among the many institutions represented in SCHMITTHOFF, supra note 15, this
class includes the American Arbitration Association, the (London) Federation of Oil,
Seeds and Fats Associations, and the Grain and Feed Trade Association. The Coffee
Trade Federation Arbitration Rules, art. 194, stipulate English law. SCHMITTHOFF, supra
note 15, at 399. Many English form contracts designate English law, displacing the need
for a rule. Under Location Court of Arbitration rule 7(2) (1970), in the absence of an
agreement by the parties, the arbitrator has the power to decide on the law governing the
substance of the contract, and the arbitration agreement as well if not included therein.
SCHMITrHOFF, supra note 15, at 306.
172. Goldman, supra note 54, at 542; Chronique, supra note 86, at 888. See
FOUCHARD, L'ARBTRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL 401 (1965).
173. Schmitthoff, A New Law Merchant, 5 CURRENT L. & Soc. PROB. 129 (1961);
Mann, Reflections on a Commercial Law of Nations, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 20 (1957).
174. Chronique, supra note 86, at 889.
175. Id. at 909.
176. Lew, supra note 135, at 10.
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for invoking a German formal requirement designed for the protection
of weaker parties. 177
As long as decisions are carefully and rigorously reasoned, there
is no cause for concern about the tendency of international arbitrators
to look more closely to commercial realities than to traditional doc-
trine. Ironically, these decisions demonstrate a more orthodox applica-
tion of pacta sunt servanda than would be obtained in most national
courts using modern contract doctrine. The success of arbitration
suggests that arbitral panels have assumed the role of equity courts of
international trade, dispensing a form of justice more closely attuned to
the needs of businessmen than that which ordinary litigation is be-
lieved to supply.1
7 8
In view of the information suggesting that amiable composition
usually involves the application of general principles of law, there is at
most a thin line between that technique and I.C.C. "anational law". It
is submitted, however, that there is some doctrinal justification for
retaining the distinction. To explain this fully, it is necessary to turn to
a class of arbitration that merits separate analysis: those arbitrations
which involve private individuals or firms as one party, and foreign
governments or their organs as the other party.
C. Arbitration with Governments
Arbitration confers special benefits in the settlement of disputes
involving governments. The private party is spared the magnified
effect of local prejudice in the courts when government interests are
implicated; moreover, the government is likely to prefer the privacy of
arbitration in order to preserve its prestige.' 79 Arbitration, consequent-
ly, has largely replaced international claims proceedings brought by
governments on behalf of their nationals who are aggrieved by the
actions of other states ,I80 and large body of arbitral decisions has
177. Chronique, supra note 86, at 910.
178. The analogy to equity might be especially meaningful when parties go to
arbitration, for instance, to deal with unforeseen circumstances or lack of clarity in the
agreement. It is sometimes said that classical contract law ascertains the parties' rela-
tionship as of the time they contracted, but equity adjusts their position as they stand
before the court. Parties interested in settling an amicable disagreement and returning to
their business are those to whom arbitration is most attractive and who are perhaps more
likely to seek the latter form of settlement than the former.
179. Arbitration with socialist governments involves many distinct considerations
and cannot be adequately treated in this study. See generally Hazard, State Trading and
Arbitration, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 93 (M. Domke 1958); Holtzmann,
Arbitration in East-West Trade, 9 INT'L LAW. 77 (1975); King-Smith, Communist
Foreign-Trade Arbitration, 10 HARV. INT'L L.J. 34 (1969).
180. Eisemann, Report on the Present Situation of International Arbitration Between
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developed, especially in the context of large scale development and
investment agreements. Since this subject has accumulated a rather
distinct body of literature, 1 ' the principal issues will be summarized
and related to those already discussed.
Although under English law the proper law for this class of
contracts is not necessarily that of the state party,182 such contracts are
often clearly localized in the state, as for instance in concession
agreements or bond issues.' 83 Occasionally arbitrators will try to di-
vine the intention of the parties. In one case the state's law was used
with comparisons to other relevant systems; 184 in another an intent not
to use the state's law was inferred from the designation of the seat of
arbitration elsewhere. 1
85
Stipulations on governing law are rather common in contracts
with governments. Public international law is chosen frequently
whether expressly or impliedly, by using such phrases as "principles
of law generally recognized" or even simply "good faith and good-
Will",186 In the well known arbitration of Saudi Arabia v. Arabian
States or State Entities (1975) (paper presented to the Fifth International Arbitration
Congress, New Delhi).
181. See generally, Panel, Arbitration Between Governments and Foreign Private
Firms, [1961] PROc. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 69; Bockstiegel, Arbitration Between States and
Private Enterprises in the International Chamber of Commerce, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 579
(1965); Ketcham, Arbitration Between a State and a Foreign Private Party, in SYM-
POSIUM, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 403 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as Ketcham]; Mann, State Contracts and International Arbitration, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 1 (1967); and especially, Spofford, Third-Party Judgment and International Economic
Transactions, 113 REC. DES COURS 121 (1964-I11) [hereinafter cited as Spofford].
182. Rex v. International Trustee, [19371 A.C. 500, 557. The literature is con-
siderable. Broches, Choice of Law Provisions in Contracts with Governments, 26 Record
of the Assoc. of the Bar of the City of N.Y. 42 (1971); Lalive, Contracts Between a State
or State Agency and a Foreign Company, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 503 (1962); Ray, Law
Governing Contracts Between States and Foreign Nationals, in 1960 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE INSTITUTE ON PRIVATE INVESTMENT ABOARD 5; Mann, The Law Governing State
Contracts, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 11 (1944); Mann, The Proper Law of Contracts
Concluded by International Persons, 35 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 34 (1959); Ramanzani,
Choice of Law Problems and Internatonal Oil Contracts-A Case Study, 11 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 503 (1962); Spofford, supra note 181, at 189-208.
183. Delaume, The Proper Law of Loans Concluded by International Persons, A
Restatement and a Forecast, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1962).
184. Alsing Trading Co. v. Greece, 23 INT'L L. REP. 633 (1956).
185. Sapphire Int'l Petroleum Ltd. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 35 INT'L L. REP. 136
(1967). In an award rendered in January, 1977, between a subsidiary of Texaco, Inc. and
Libya arising out of the nationalization of certain concessions, the sole arbitrator
appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice ruled that "under
principles common to international and Libyan law", the concessions in question were
binding on the Libyan government. Texaco, Inc. Press Release, March 3, 1977.
186. The belief that only contracts between states may be truly international is now
not widely held. Serbian Loans Case, [1927] P.C.I.J. ser. A Nos. 20/21 (dictum). At the
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American Oil Co. 187 the elaborate choice of law clause provided that
Saudi Arabian law was to apply to all matters within Saudi Arabian
jurisdiction, and as to all other questions, "the law deemed by the
Arbitral Tribunal to be applicable" would govern. 188 The tribunal
determined that the legal nature of the concession would be determined
by examining general principles and comparative law;' 89 the law
applicable to the concession as a contract would be determined by
Saudi Arabian law and custom;' 90 maritime custom and practice would
determine the commercial aspects of the concession;' 91 and public
international law would dictate the responsibility of the state for
violating its obligations. 1
92
Few states willingly accept the designation of a national law
other than its own. Yet, application of that state's law may lead to
some distasteful possibilities for for the private party. For example, the
applicable state law might include postagreement legislation which
impairs the private party's rights. Even if this possibility were ex-
cluded by the agreement, there always would be the risk that a state
would utilize its sovereign authority to enact legislation. The protec-
tion of alien rights and property is, of course, the subject of a large
body of public international law, 19 3 and this issue is the underlying
theme of the choice of law question in this class of arbitration. 1
94
Outstanding among the efforts to introduce some predictability
into this situation195 is the 1966 Convention on the Settlement of
other extreme, an unsupported dictum by Justice Megaw in Orion Cia. Espaiiola de
Seguros v. Belfort Maats., [1962] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 257, 264 (Q.B.), suggests that public
international law may be used by arbitrators even in purely private contracts.
The "good faith" language is found in the Lena Goldfields case. See Nussbaum,
The Arbitration Between the Lena Goldfields Ltd., and the Soviet Government, 36
CORNELL L.Q. 31 (1950).
187. 27 Int'l L. Rep. 117 (1958), which is referred to in this article as the Aramco
Arbitration.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 158.
190. Id. at 109.
191. Id. at 171.
192. Id. at 172.
193. In the present connection, see Schwartzenberger, The Investment of Property
Abroad, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, LIBER AMERCORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 313
(Sanders ed. 1967).
194. Another problem is that the law of the state may not be sufficiently developed
to govern the transaction; thus, in the Abu Dhabi arbitration, there was found to be no
local law of commercial instruments, 18 INT'L L. REP. 144 (1953). Designating pure
public international law also may leave more gaps for the arbitrator to fill than the parties
are willing to accept.
195. On the use of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, see Ketcham, supra note
181, at 410, and Spofford, supra note 181, at 151.
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Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States,' 96 a
multilateral treaty sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development. The Convention establishes an International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 197 with
provisions for both concilation and arbitration. Submission to Centre
jurisdiction is entirely voluntary on the part of both state and private
party, but is limited to settlement of "legal disputes" arising out of an
"investment".' 98 Although the latter term seems to exclude the ordi-
nary sale of goods, the simple addition of long term credit terms could
qualify a transaction under a broad reading of the phrase.' 99 Arbitra-
tion, once elected, is the exclusive remedy available, 20 0 and challenge
to the proceedings may be made only through the Convention's elabo-
rate procedural provisions. 2 1' The Convention effectively eliminates
the concept of the "law of the proceedings" from its arbitrations and
precludes the assertion of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction with
respect to the arbitration agreement. 20 2 A unique feature of ICSID
196. Done Mar. 18, 1965, entered into force Oct. 14, 1966, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575
U.N.T.S. 159, [1967] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 25, (Cmnd. 3255) [hereinafter cited as World
Bank Convention]. On the Convention generally, the best source is Broches, The
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, 136 REC. DES COURs 331 (1972-11) [hereinafter cited as Broches]; See also
Note, International Arbitration Between States and Foreign Investors-The World Bank
Convention, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1359 (1966).
197. World Bank Convention, supra note 196, § I.
198. Id. at art. 25(1).
199. See International Arbitration Between States and Foreign Investors, supra note
196, at 1362-64; Broches, supra note 196, at 361. As of June, 1977, there were four
arbitrations pending under the Centre's auspices. Telephone conversation with Karin
Nordlander, Attorney, International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes,
June 27, 1977.
200. World Bank Convention, supra note 196, art. 26.
201. See ICSID Regulations and Rules, reprinted in SCHMITTHOFF, supra note 15.
202. Thus, the implementing legislation for the Convention provides that domestic
arbitration statutes do not apply to Convention proceedings and awards. Arbitration
(International Investment Disputes) Act, c. 41, § 3 (1)-(2) (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966
Arbitration Act]. Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes Act, Aug. 11, 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-532, 80 Stat. 344 [hereinafter cited as Settlement of Investment Disputes
Act]. See also Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes: Hearings on H.R.
15785 Before the Subcomm. on International Organization and Movements of the Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
The problem of sovereign immunity led the arbitrator in the Aramco case to
conclude that arbitrations to which a state is a party cannot have a law of the proceedings
at all. 27 INT'L L. REP. 153-66 (1963); contra, Sapphire Arbitration, 35 INT'L L. REP. 168-
70 (1967). This is rather broad, but aside from the Convention, sovereign immunity from
jurisdiction may be a real problem in compelling governments to comply with arbitration
agreements. Much of the law of sovereign immunity has arisen in the arbitration context,
and thus deserves mention.
United States law on sovereign immunity is now embodied in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602-1611 (1976). For federal courts, the Act largely
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arbitration is that its awards can be challenged only through the Centre.
Moreover, the awards automatically have the status of "final judg-
ments of the domestic courts" of signatory states. 20 3 National arbitra-
tion enactments do not apply to ICSID proceedings, 20 4 and the drafters
decided against a public policy clause, thereby closing a classic
loophole to enforcement of awards.
20 5
The Convention's choice of law provision, article 42, reflects two
issues which preoccupied the drafters: party autonomy and the applica-
bility of public international law by the panel. There was a consensus
favoring acceptance of the former in principle, but there was con-
troversy over permitting arbitrators to choose, in the absence of a
stipulation by the parties, either international law or a national law
other than that of the state, in place of the state's law as a whole. Yet,
it clearly was crucial that the body of international law dealing with
acquired rights and protection of foreign investment be given some
role in the arbitration. The final draft accommodates these considera-
tions as follows:
206
1) The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance
with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the
absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law
of the Contracting State (including its rules on the conflict of
codifies the rule that governments engaged in actions jure gestionis are not entitled at all
to immunity from jurisdiction. British practice was to grant full immunity, but the Court
of Appeal recently accepted the restrictive doctrine. Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria, 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 477 (C.A. 1977).
An entirely different problem is immunity from execution, which article 55 of the
Convention allows contracting states to retain. A suit to confirm an award does not
involve execution immunity but rather jurisdictional immunity; see Societi Europiene
d'Etudes et d'Enterprises v. Yugoslavia, 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 71 (High Court,
Neth., 1975) (suit to confirm an award under the New York Convention wherein the state
acted jure gestionis, and sovereign immunity plea was rejected). United States law on
execution immunity is covered by the new Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-
1611 (1976). A truly obstructive government probably would not even permit the litiga-
tion to reach the enforcement stage.
203. World Bank Convention, supra note 196, art. 54(1).
204. 1966 Arbitration Act, supra note 202, c.41, § i; Settlement of Investment
Disputes Act, supra note 202. In Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron.Devices, Inc.,
the court rejected a rather fanciful argument that the Convention governs all arbitrations
between states and private firms where the two states involved have both ratified the
Convention. 489 F.2d 1313, 1317-18 n.3 (2d Cir. 1973).
205. Broches, supra note 196, at 402-03.
206. On the drafting history of article 42, see Broches, The Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States: Ap-
plicable Law and Default Procedure, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, LIBER AMER-
CORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 12-21 (Sanders ed. 1967).
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laws) and such rules of international law as may be applica-
ble.
2) The Tribunal may not bring in a finding of non liquet
on the ground of silence or obscurity of the law.
3) The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not
prejudice the power of the Tribunal to decide a dispute ex
aequo et bono if the parties so agree.
The report accompanying the Convention cites article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice 20 7 as a definition of interna-
tional law, but further elaboration on the substantive aspects clearly
was beyond the scope of the primarily procedural Convention.
The parties are free to designate international law, or any law or
combination of laws. For the frequent case in which there is no express
designation, 208 international law comes into play when the law of the
state calls for it to apply. 2 9 This would be the case if the relationship
were governed directly by international law, for instance by a treaty, or
most crucially, if the state's law were to violate international law.
210
Although the drafters envisioned that the arbitrator's first look would
be to the state's law, that law in turn was to be measured against the
requirements of public international law even if no actual judgment as
to the validity of the state's law was to be made. 211 In view of the status
of ICSID awards as domestic judgments, this ensures, far more effec-
tively than any contract provision, that discriminatory or expropriatory
measures by the state will at least be carefully scrutinized and at best
not be given effect.
2 12
207. The article reads:
The Court, whose function it is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international customs, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations as
subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law.
I.C.J. STAT. art. 38(l), reprinted in 4 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 530 n.l (1965).
208. Broches, supra note 196, at 390.
209. This is one role for the otherwise dubious renvoi clause. Id. Broches explains
that renvoi should be excluded when a stipulation of governing law is made.
210. Id. at 392.
211. Id.
212. The Convention, however, does not necessarily provide for post-agreement
changes in law. This should be dealt with by using one of the model clauses the Centre
recommends. See Amerasinghe, Model Clauses for Settlement of Investment Disputes,
28 ARB. J. 232 (1973), and more generally, Firth, The Law Governing Contracts in
Arbitration Under the World Bank Convention, I N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 245 (1968).
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Article 42(1) addresses the knotty question of the capacity of
states to submit to a system of national law other than their own, and
conversely, the capacity of private persons to be subject to public
international law. The article makes both situations possible within the
framework of the Centre, a creation of international agreement. How-
ever, preoccupation with such questions accomplishes little more than
to obscure a more critical analysis of choice of law problems in this
area. As one practitioner has stated,
the governing law should, in principle, depend on the nature
of the transaction rather than the status of the parties ...
[W]hen States engage in economic activities of an essentially
private nature, they should expect to be subject to the sub-
stantive law governing commercial activities. If corporations
take on the form and roles of States they should be subject to
international rules.
21 3
This approach avoids obfuscating of the differing responsibilities
of governments and private parties by requiring a more careful defini-
tion of their status and obligations. Moreover, this view of the legal
relationships between states and private parties sheds some light on the
I.C.C.'s proposal for "supranational" arbitration.
When a government and a private party contract, the different
status of the parties requires placing formal dispute settlement on a
legal plane apart from either of them. Thus, ICSID awards are truly
"supranational". Such awards are immune from any law of the pro-
ceedings and consequently from judicial review or supervision, and are
backed directly by treaty obligation. Why any such benefits should
accrue to arbitration purely between two private parties is far from
clear. In fact, the proponents of "supranational" arbitration have not
produced any particularly trenchant reasons why private parties should
escape the "limitations" of national law simply because they elect a
forum other than the national courts to resolve their disputes. If the
parties intend that varying national policies should not attach to agree-
ments that have sufficient foreign contacts, then the precise role of
conflicts analysis is to prevent such results. 214 It is submitted that
Arbitrations with government agencies under contracts of guaranty designed to
promote overseas investment may eliminate some of the political and legal problems that
underly choice of law issues in this context. One such United States agency is the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), created pursuant to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1969, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2192-2200 (a) (1970). See Arbitration Between
International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., Sud America and Overseas Private
Investment Corp., 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1307 (1974) and generally, FATOURAS,
GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS (1962).
213. Spofford, supra note 181, at 191.
214. A perfect example is arbitrability. See text accompanying notes 311-14 infra.
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unless there are governmental parties to the arbitration, or perhaps if
applicable substantive law is nonexistent or underdeveloped, then the
existing legal systems and their conflicts rules retain enough flexibility
to accommodate the needs of international commercial arbitration, if
used with imagination and intelligence. The awards noted previously
demonstrate just such an application.
It should be remembered that the greatest obstacle to the growth
of international commercial arbitration has not been lack of uniformity
in the procedural or substantive laws applied by the arbitrator, but
rather the hurdles placed by national courts to recognition of foreign
arbitration agreements and awards. It is to the efforts to resolve these
problems through treaty that this analysis will now turn.
II. CONFLICT OF LAWS PROBLEMS IN COURT PROCEEDINGS
REGARDING ARBITRATION.
While the preceding section dealt with the procedural and sub-
stantive conflicts issues faced by the arbitrator, this section deals with
the more familiar issues faced by the court when it is asked to enter
into the arbitral process.
There have been many efforts to ascertain whether arbitration is
essentially "jurisdictional" or "contractual" .215 The temporal aspect
of arbitration suggests a more useful approach to the conflicts prob-
lems arising from arbitration. The agreement to arbitrate is itself a
contract, albeit of a rather special variety; but by the time an award has
been made, the winning party has what amounts to an inchoate judg-
ment which requires a further judicial imprimatur to be fully effective.
This indicates that contract principles should be applied to arbitration
problems in their earlier stages, but that the award should be con-
sidered in terms of the principles governing recognition of judgments.
This approach may help to clarify a seldom appreciated problem:
the conflicts questions inherent in judicial review of the arbitrator's
application of law. It was noted earlier that law and custom vary
widely with regard to the arbitrator's duties to decide under rules of
law and to give reasons to explain his decision. Consequently, it is
uncertain when a party may oppose confirmation of a foreign award
based on a claim that the arbitrator's error of law should prevent
enforcement. Treating the award as a foreign judgment will aid the
analysis at this point.
It is hornbook law that foreign judgments are not open to reexami-
nation on the merits, but only to a jurisdictional inquiry and to claims
215. See note 75 supra.
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such as fraud, unfair procedures, and conflict with public policy. 216
The losing party should get only one chance to contest the merits
through the appellate process in the rendering forum. The same basic
approach should govern challenges to arbitral awards, but complica-
tions arise because the rendering forum and the confirming forum may
well have differing rules concerning review on law, and because the
party seeking confirmation may or may not have already sought confir-
mation of the award in the rendering state.
It is the law of the rendering jurisdiction that determines whether
legal rules must be applied by arbitrators, and it is to the courts of that
state that the party seeking review on law must proceed. If the law of
the rendering jurisdiction allows review, the party should either seek
review on his own or challenge the award within the framework of
domestic confirmation proceedings. If review on law is not permitted,
there is no reason why foreign courts in an enforcement proceeding
should reopen the issue, irrespective of what forum law such review
concerns. A losing party who did not raise the question at the proper
stage should not be afforded another chance which might permit him to
take advantage of a different legal system.
217
The court in Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Sociiti
Ginirale de 1'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA) 218 did not fully appreciate
the potential for such abuse. This was a simple proceeding under the
New York Convention in the New York federal courts to confirm an
I.C.C. award. The dispute arose out of a construction agreement to be
performed in Egypt between Parsons & Whittemore, a United States
firm, and RAKTA, an Egyptian firm. The opinion states neither
where the arbitration took place nor where the award was rendered.
Among a barrage of objections, Parsons & Whittemore contended that
the award was in "manifest disregard of the law". 219 From the opinion
it is unclear upon what this claim precisely was based, although one of
the arguments was that the arbitrator had ignored one of the contract
provisions relating to damage claims. The court found the record so
weak that it was unnecessary to decide whether the "manifest disre-
gard" defense is available under the Convention. The court might have
216. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 21, at 1018; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 98 (1971); see Von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications:
a Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601 (1968). This, of course, is
aside from any questions of comity.
217. Accord, DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 21, at 1068. Perhaps this rule might be
relaxed where a court, although reviewing a foreign award, reviews a question of its own
forum law, particularly if this was not done by the rendering court.
218. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
219. See text accompanying notes 101-06 supra.
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further observed that apart from the defenses allowed under the Con-
vention, the court should be very reluctant to review an award for
errors of fact or law which could have been raised and corrected at an
earlier stage.
220
The sort of problem presented in Parsons & Whittemore was a
direct result of the multiplicity of requirements contained in national
arbitration enactments and their judicial glosses. It is not surprising
that unification of the law regarding confirmation of foreign awards
which have not been reduced to judgment has been a favorite area for
private law treaty activity. The early efforts in this direction were the
Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses and the Convention on the
Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The United Kingdom is a party
to both agreements; the United States to neither. Although the New
York Convention was signed in 1958, the United States did not ratify it
until 1970, and, in a long awaited development, the United Kingdom
has also formally acceded to it.
221
The principal benefit to England in accession will not be easier
enforcement of foreign awards, for this has never been difficult in
England, a reflection of the widespread acceptance of arbitration
there. 222 Indeed, there is litle reported English case law dealing with
defenses to the enforcement of foreign awards. Adoption of the New
York convention, therefore, does not signal any significant changes in
British arbitration practice.
223
Instead, the benefits to Britain are likely to accrue in foreign
courts. Britain is not a party to the 1905 Hague Convention on Civil
Procedure, 224 and parties relying on English judgments in certain
European courts have had to pay prohibitive security for costs. Acces-
sion to the Convention will make English awards considerably easier
to enforce abroad than judgments under similar circumstances. Fur-
thermore, many contracts now provide that arbitration must be held in
a New York Convention signatory country. United Kingdom accession
truly closes the circle of international enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments and awards.
225
220. This analysis has the disadvantage of tending to require a double exequatur,
which the Convention was meant to eliminate. See text accompanying notes 255-60
infra.
221. The Arbitration Act 1975, c.3; see note 5 supra.
222. Cohn, The Fifth Report of the Private International Law Committee, 25 MOD.
L. REV. 449 (1962). Cf. Fifth Report, supra note 78, at 5.
223. Interview with Michael Mustill, Q.C., supra note 138.
224. July 17, 1905, 103 MARTENS (10 N.R.T. 3d.) 243 (1905).
225. See Quigley, Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 58 A.B.A.J. 821, 822
(1972).
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Because the Convention has engendered considerable litera-
ture,226 the present treatment will concentrate on certain areas in order
to avoid duplication. These are: the meaning of "foreign" arbitration
and awards, the finality problem, the law applicable to the arbitration
agreement and the arbitrability problem, and the public policy defense.
A. "Foreign" Arbitration and Awards
Certain civil law systems define the nationality of an award
according to the procedure followed or the nationality of the parties
and not by the seat of the proceedings. Thus, an arbitration held in
country X between two nationals of Y or under Y procedural law may
be treated as a Y award in confirmation proceedings in X. Common
law countries take a more territorial approach. One commentator
sought a comprehensive definition of the "domestic" award and
considered certain possible indices such as the nationality of the
arbitrators, the procedural law which was followed, the "system of
law from which the award derives its effect," the national court which
would have jurisdiction over the dispute apart from the arbitration and
the simple territorial approach. After rejecting them all, the author's
definition of a domestic award was one that
conforms to and complies with the procedural legal rules of
the country that recognizes and enforces the award, pro-
vided the courts of that country would have jurisdiction to
settle the dispute resolved by the award. . . . [11f the courts
of the recognizing and enforcing country would have juris-
diction to settle the dispute, and the arbitral award conforms
to .the procedural legal rules of that country, the award is to
be qualified as domestic.227
This test, although carefully worked out, is awkward and indirect.
The applicability of the conventions is contingent on a determination
of whether or not an award is "foreign", and the test should be easier
to apply than the above test. The attempts in the Geneva agreements to
226. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Quigley]; Bateson, The 1958 Convention on Foreign Arbitral
Awards, [1958] J. Bus. L. 393; Contini, supra note 57; Address by Domke to Fifty-Third
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 30, 1959), reprinted
in 53 AM. J. INT'L. L. 414 (1959); Pisar, supra note 63, at 219, 342; Sultan, The United
Nation's Convention and United States Policy, 53 AM. J. INT'L. L. 807 (1959). For a
summary of the drafting history, see G. HAIGHT, Summary Analysis of the Conference on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral A wards, (1958) (unpublished paper
in Eastman Library, New York, New York) [hereinafter cited as HAIGHT].
227. Szfszy, supra note 73, at 671.
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resolve this issue were among its notable shortcomings. The Protocol
applied to arbitration agreements between parties "subject respectively
to the jurisdiction of different contracting States." 228 This diversity
clause has been roundly criticized as inappropriate and ambiguous.
The English courts have had difficulty with this provision as it
was embodied in section 4(2) of the 1950 Arbitration Act. In Brazen-
dale v. Saint Freres S.A. ,229 an English firm entered into a contract
with a French firm which had a place of business in London for the
purchase of a quantity of jute. After deciding to lift a discretionary stay
of court proceedings under section 4(1) of the Act, the court was faced
with determining whether the parties were "subject to the juris-
diction" of France and England, both of whom were contracting
parties. The court rejected a simple nationality test and adopted a
rather more restrictive standard. The parties to the contract were
required to have places of residence and carry on business therefrom in
two different contracting states, and in addition, the contract contain-
ing the submission to arbitration must have resulted from the business
so conducted. 230 Because the agreement was between the English firm
and the French firm's London office, the second requirement was not
met, section 4(2) was not applicable, and the mandatory stay required
by that section did not issue.
The New York Convention omits this obscure phrase, but its
provision on arbitration agreements, article 11,231 creates another and
greater problem; it contains no language limiting the agreements
covered to those with foreign contacts of any kind. This lapse in
drafting must, of course be read in light of the rest of the Convention,
which deals solely with foreign awards. Nonetheless, the apparent
requirement that domestic courts must grant stays of all actions pend-
ing arbitration has been cited as the principal cause for the United
228. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 55, art. 1, para. I.
229. [1970] 2 Q.B. 34
230. Id. at 42.
231. Article 11 reads:
()Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under
which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences
which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect to a defined
legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter
capable of settlement by arbitration.
(2)The term "agreement in writing" shall include an arbitral clause in a
contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an
exchange of letters or telegrams.
(3)The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter
in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of
this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to
arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative
or incapable of being performed.
New York Convention, supra note 5.
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Kingdom's delay in acceding to the Convention, since all such stays
for domestic arbitrations are discretionary under English law.232 Inac-
tion and parliamentary confusion seem to be an equally likely rea-
son. 233 The Lord Chancellor's Private International Law Committee
felt that a provision in the implementing legislation limiting the scope
of article II would do little violence to the spirit of the Convention if it
were drafted narrowly enough. The Committee proposed the following
formulation:
[An agreement should be treated for the purpose of our
legislation as domestic if (and only if):
1) The agreement to arbitrate is subject to the law of
England, Scotland, or Northern Ireland, or
2) all parties thereto are either domiciled or ordinarily
resident within the United Kingdom at the date the agree-
ment was made, and in either case the agreement does not
expressly provide for arbitration in a.Convention country
other than the United Kingdom.3
The Committee added that "in the case of companies[,] the question as
to what constitutes ordinary residence will be governed by the [United
Kingdom] rules.' '235
The version in the 1975 Act is considerably narrower. Section 1
of the Act, which entirely replaces section 4(2) of the 1950 Act,2 36
only applies, to an arbitration agreement which is not a "domestic
agreement", 237 defined as one
which does not provide, expressly or by implication, for
arbitration in a State other than the United Kingdom and to
which neither
a) an individual who is a national of, or habitually [a]
resident in, any State other than the United Kingdom; nor
b) a body corporate which is incorporated in, or whose
central management and control is exercised in, any State
other than the United Kingdom; is a party at the time the
proceedings are commenced.238
When the multiple negatives are sorted out, it appears that if any
party is not of United Kingdom nationality, and the agreement either
provides for arbitration outside the United Kingdom or is silent on the
232. Arbitration Act, supra note 13, §4(1).
233. 354 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 962 (1974); 884 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 621-
30 (1974).
234. Fifth Report, supra note 78, at 9.
235. Id.
236. Arbitration Act, 1975, c.3, § 8(2)(a), see note 5 supra.
237. Id. § 2.
238. Id. § 4.
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point, then it is governed by the Convention. 239 The reference in the
Committee's draft to the law governing the arbitration agreement
seems to have been intended as a parallel to section 40(b) of the 1950
Act, which provides that nothing in part II of the Act, which imple-
mented the 1927 Convention on Awards, shall apply to an award made
pursuant to an arbitration agreement governed by English law. Part II
of the Act, including section 40(b), remains in force under the 1975
Act, although only if the latter does not cover the award. 240 This
provision is another demonstration of the significance English law
attaches to the circumstance that English law governs a contract. It is
mildly anomalous, but surely of no great practical significance, that
the nationality of the award, for Convention purposes, might still be
determined by looking to the law governing the arbitration agreement.
However, in making the same inquiry as to the agreement itself, that
factor is quite irrelevant, at least under the statute.
241
The 1927 Convention dealt with the nationality of the award by
tying covered awards to agreements covered by the Protocol, repeating
the diversity requirement and requiring the award to have been made in
the territory of a party state. 242 The United Kingdom legislation adds
the requirement that the award must not have been made pursuant to an
agreement governed by English law. The drafters of the new Conven-
tion were faced with a split between those who desired a simple
territorial approach and the civil law domestic-foreign definitions. 243 A
working party was set up to consider the question; 21 the result was the
present article I, paragraph 1:
239. The Committee noted that the decisions in the Halifax Overseas Freightors,
Ltd. v. Rasao Export; Technoprominport; and Polskie Linie Oceaniczne P.P. W. [1958] 2
Lloyd's L.R. 146, and Olver v. Hiller, [1959] 1 W.L.R. 551, could not be reconciled with
article III paragraph 3. The latter two cases were entirely domestic and would be
excluded from the new Act. Although the first might be so governed, the significant fact
is that under section 4(2) of the old Act, the court had no discretion either. There is in
fact very little change in the law on this point.
240. Arbitration Act, 1975, c.3, § 2, see note 5 supra.
241. The United Kingdom legislation contains a further refinement on the Conven-
tion's provisions on agreements. The concept of a court having no discretion whatever in
ordering a stay apparently so rankled the British legislators that the provision implement-
ing the 1923 Protocol permitted the courts to retain a case if they found that "there is not
in fact any dispute with regard to the matter to be referred." As suggested in the Fifth
Report, supra note 78, at 27, this phrase remains in section I of the new Act. Although
criticized by Nussbaum, supra note 69, at 225-59, this proviso serves as a useful remedy
against nuisance litigation.
242, Geneva Convention, supra note 56, art. 1, para. 1.
243. 22 U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/L.6 (1958); 22 U.N. ESCOR 10, U.N.
Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.6 (1958).
244. 22 U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/L.42 (1958). See HAIGHT, supra note
226, at I-5.
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This Convention shall apply to the recognition and en-
forcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State
other than the State where the recognition and enforcement
of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences
between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also
apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards
in the State where their recognition and enforcement are
sought.
This provision omits the old requirements of diversity that the
award be made in pursuance of a Convention agreement, and that the
award be rendered in the territory of a contracting party.2 45 Although it
is a clear improvement over the earlier agreement, this provision gives
no certain guide to its application. A fair reading suggests that the
court must rely on its preexisting concepts to choose between the first
and second sentences. The Private International Law Committee
queried whether the second sentence of the paragraph would require
United Kingdom courts to consider a United Kingdom award made
under foreign law "foreign". 246 The 1975 Act does not reproduce
section 40(b) of the 1950 Act, suggesting that simple territoriality will
be the test in determining whether an award is governed by the
Convention. More decisively, awards rendered within the United
Kingdom do not fall under the new Act. 247 The point is not of much
practical importance because the summary procedure of section 26 of
the 1950 Act is available for non-Convention awards as well. 248
United States courts, lacking the background of the prior agree-
ments, are facing nationality problems for the first time. The instinct of
245. However, article 1(3) permits a state, "on the basis of reciprocity, [to] declare
that it will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only
in the territory of another Contracting State." The United States has ratified the
Convention subject to this reservation, and it appears in section 7(1) of the new United
Kingdom Act. Article XIV of the Convention contains a general reciprocity clause. See
Quigley, supra note 225, at 1061; McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations
Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States, 2 J. MAR. L. & COM. 735,
740-41. & n.29 (1971) [hereinafter cited as McMahon].
246. Fifth Report, supra note 78, at 22.
247. Arbitration Act, 1975, c.3, § 7(l), see note 5 supra.
248. This was decided with reference to the 1927 Convention in Dalmia Cement Ltd.
v. National Bank of Pakistan, [1975] I Q.B. 9, noted in 34 CAMB. L.J. 44 (1975), aff'd
The Times, May 10, 1977, at 5, col. I (C.A.). In that case it was held that the Convention
did not apply since no Order in Council had been promoted for Pakistan, although it was
clearly a party to the Convention. Under the 1975 Arbitration Act section 7(2), the
existence of an Order in Council is conclusive evidence that a state is a party, but unlike
the old Act, it is not a prerequisite for application.
It should be added that common law actions on the award are always possible even
if the Convention does not apply. See RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION, supra note 7, at 340.
Vol. 7
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United States courts, derived from interstate practice, is to take a
territorial approach. The implementing legislation for the Convention
makes an interesting comparison with United Kingdom analogue. It
adopts a flexible contacts determination for both agreements and
awards, while preserving a fundamentally domicile based test:
An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of
a legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which is
considered as commercial, including a transaction, contract,
or agreement described in section 2 of this title, falls under
the Convention. An agreement or award arising out of such a
relationship which is entirely between citizens of the United
States shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention
unless that relationship involves property located abroad,
envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some
other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.
For the purpose of this section[,] a corporation is a citizen of
the United States if it is incorporated or has its principal
place of business in the United States.249
In Fuller Co. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinie,250 a federal
district court in Pennsylvania gave this provision a thoughtful reading.
Fuller, a Pennsylvania firm, agreed to construct and equip a plant in
Guinea for a Delaware firm (CBG) which owned a bauxite mine in that
country. When the Delaware firm's consulting engineer asserted that
some of the equipment Fuller was supplying was defective, CBG
initiated arbitration under an I.C.C. arbitration clause in the underlying
contract. The original situs for arbitration in the agreement was Gene-
va, Switzerland; however, the seat was later changed to Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania by mutual consent. The court was faced with determin-
ing whether the agreement between the two United States parties had
enough foreign contacts to satisfy section 202 of the Arbitration Act .251
The court read the "reasonable connection" test of section 1-105 of
the Uniform Commercial Code into the statute and found sufficient
contacts with Guinea to sustain jurisdiction under section 202.
The question remains whether awards rendered within the United
States can be governed by the Convention. The United States reciproc-
ity reservation to the Convention states that the United States applies
the Convention, "on the basis of reciprocity to the recognition and
enforcement of only those awards made in the territory of another
contracting state." It may be argued that this language only determines
249. Arbitration Act § 202, 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1970 & Supp. 1976).
250. 421 F. Supp. 938 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
251. Arbitration Act § 202, 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1970 & Supp. 1976).
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which awards rendered abroad are governed by the Convention, and
that the contacts test of section 202 of the Arbitration Act, which apply
to both awards and agreements, preempts both the reciprocity reserva-
tion and the first sentence of article I, paragraph 1 of the Conven-
tion.252 Thus, section 202 of the Arbitration Act would define a
"foreign" award under the apparently alternative second sentence of
article I, paragraph 1 of the Convention. The courts 253 and the com-
mentators 254 are dubious, but the argument for coverage has support in
policy. Many truly international arbitrations may conclude with
awards rendered in the United States, and there is no reason to exclude
them from the preferential provisions of the Convention, especially
since agreements are clearly governed by the Convention. The Fuller
court noted this dichotomy, 255 but did not comment on its absurdity.
B. The Finality Problem
Reducing an award to judgment in the state where the award is
considered domestic is usually a summary proceeding. If the judgment
so obtained is taken abroad for enforcement, it should be treated as
such, and the Conventions on awards would not apply. Clearly, a
primary purpose of agreements such as the Convention should be to
eliminate the need for post-award judicial proceedings in the rendering
jurisdiction. This is the "double exequatur" problem.
Many courts understandably are reluctant to permit enforcement
of a foreign award that is involved in litigation elsewhere, usually in
the rendering forum. Because some challenges touch the merits, it is
sometimes difficult to tell whether an award has reached the proper
stage of finality under the law of the rendering state. Nor is it always
clear whether such litigation is not simply for the purpose of delay.
252. 1. This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the
recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of
differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to
arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their
recognition and enforcement are sought.
2. The term "arbitral awards" shall include not only awards made by
arbitrators appointed for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral
bodies to which the parties have submitted.
New York Convention, supra note 5, art. I, para. 1.
253. I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 426 n. 2 (2d Cir.
1974).
254. Compare McMahon, supra note 245, at 740-42, with Aksen, American Arbitra-
tion Accession Arrives in the Age ofAquarius: United States Implements United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 Sw. U.L.
REV. 1, 6 (1971).
255. 421 F. Supp. 938 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
Vol. 7
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The 1927 Convention dealt rather clumsily with the problem of
balancing the need for an award to be a final determination of the
dispute against the problem of obstructive recourse to the courts of the
rendering state. Under its article I, paragraph 2(d), the party seeking
confirmation of the award had to show that the award was "final",
which could not be the case if proceedings "for the purpose of
contesting the validity of the award [were] pending." If the party
seeking confirmation did not meet this burden, the court had to refuse
enforcement. Thus, while the proponent of the award had a negative
burden of proof, the opponent had a wide opportunity for obstruction
in the rendering state. The provision did not even make explicit
whether or not the "double exequatur" was abolished. This latter
point was not decided clearly in English law until the decision in Union
Nationale des Cooperatives Agricoles de Cereales v. Robert Catterall
& Co., Ltd. 256 The court, interpreting sections 39 and 37 (1)(d) of the
1950 Act, 257 held that section 39 neither defined "final" nor required a
foreign award to be reduced to judgment in the rendering forum, but it
applied in a situation where, for instance, an award might be subject to
further appeal within an arbitration institution.
The "double exequatur" was a preoccupation at the Conference
which led to the New York Convention. The draft Convention of 1955
suggested a "double exequatur" by requiring that the award be "final
and operative, and in particular that its enforcement has not been
suspended."258 At the Conference, the question was sent to a working
party, whose draft 259 essentially forms the present'article V (1)(e).
Under this provision, recognition and enforcement of the award may
be denied if the party opposing confirmation shows that
the award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has
been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was
made.
Clearly, much depends on the definition given to the word "bind-
ing". The working party believed that only the availability of "ordi-
256. [1959] 2 K.B. 44.
257. Section 37 (1)(d) reproduces the Convention provision. Section 39, which is
also derived from the Convention, reads:
For the purposes of this Act, an award shall not be deemed final if any
proceedings for the purpose of contesting the validity of the award are pending
in the Country in which it was made.
258. 19 U.N. ESCOR 7, U.N. Doc. E/2704, Annex (1955).
259. 22 U.N. ESCOR 1, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/L.43 (1958). See Firth, Finality of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 25 ARB. J. 1, 13-15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Firth]; HAIGHT,
supra note 226, at 34-35, 39-41, 59-65.
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nary means of recourse", that is, appeal on the merits as opposed to
objections in a summary proceeding, would render an award not
"binding". 26° A strict "double exequatur" system was rejected.26 ' As
in the case of all of the New York Convention defenses, the burden
now is on the party opposing enforcement, a distinct improvement
over the older agreements. Furthermore, under the newer Convention,
the court is given discretion to
adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the award and
may also, upon the application of the party claiming enforce-
ment of the award, order the other party to give suitable
security. 262
This, of course, gives the court a measure of flexibility when there are
proceedings in two forums.
New York law has evolved without international agreements, but
it is at least clear that a court judgment on the award is not a prerequi-
site to enforcement. 263 The finality problem was before the court in a
recent federal district court decision, Landegger v. Bayerische Hy-
potheken und Wechsel Bank.264 In that case, confirmation was sought
for a German award that was still the subject of an appeal pending in
the German courts. The district court neglected to consider the Con-
vention, 265 and relied instead on the applicable Treaty of Friendship,
260. 22 U.N. ESCOR 13, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.17 (1958).
261. See Firth, supra note 259, at 16.
262. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. VI. The phrase "under the law of
which" in article V (1)(e) apparently refers to the situation where a court asserts
jurisdiction over foreign arbitrations.
263. The famous leading case is Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706
(1931), of which it has been said that it accomplished more for the enforcement of
foreign awards in the United States than the Geneva Convention did in the countries that
ratified it. Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 823. See also Sargant v. Monroe, 268 App. Div.
123, 49 N.Y.S. 2d 46 (1944); Coudenhove-Kalergi v. Dieterle, 36 N.Y.S. 2d 313 (Sup. Ct.
1942); Oilcakes and Oilseeds Trading Co. v. Sinason-Teicher Inter American Grain Co.,
8 N.Y. 2d 852, 168 N.E. 2d 708, 203 N.Y.S. 2d 904 (1960); Van Engelbrechten v.
Galvanoni and Nevy Brothers, 59 Misc. 2d 721, 300 N.Y.S. 2d 239 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
1969), aff'd per curiam, 61 Misc. 2d 959, 307 N.Y.S. 2d 381 (App. Div. 1970), appeal
dismissed, 27 N.Y. 2d 1033, 264 N.E. 2d 128, 315 N.Y.S. 2d 1033 (1970). An unreported
New York decision refused to confirm a Danish award which had the same status as the
one in Catterall's case, [1959] 2 Q.B. 44, 45; Wallcarriers v. Trinity Corp., N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 27, 1961, at 14 (reported by DOMKE, supra note 7, at 365).
264. 357 F. Supp. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See generally Goldblum, International
Commercial Arbitration 6 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 153 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
International Commercial Arbitration].
265. Both Germany and the United States were parties to the Convention at the
time, and although there is authority for not applying treaties to preexisting contract
rights, see DOMKE, supra note 7, at 368, the point was at least arguable. The Second
Circuit has since decided that the Convention does have retroactive effect. In re
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Navigation and Commerce, 266 which applies to awards which are
"final and enforceable under the laws of the place where rendered".
Since under German law a hearing and exequatur were necessary for
actual enforceability,267 this award was final,268 but not enforceable in
Germany. Instead of so noting, the court observed that it was not
limited to enforcing awards covered by the Treaty; rather the issue was
whether the New York courts would enforce this award. The court then
looked to Van Engelbrechten v. Galvanoni and Nevy Brothers,269
which had construed the same treaty. There, the award had been filed
with the court but no exequatur had been obtained. Consequently, the
award was in the same position as in Landegger;270 the award was
final, but not enforceable. Under the liberal New York decisions,
enforcement was allowed.
The Galvanoni case was not the subject of pending judicial pro-
ceedings in Germany as was the award in Landegger. Galvanoni
therefore was not controlling on the finality issue in Landegger. Still,
the result in Landegger was correct, and it undoubtedly would have
been reached under the Convention.
271
Fotochrome, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Fotochrome, Inc.
v. Copal Co., Ltd., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
The court also decided that when the Convention and an earlier and narrower
F.C.N. treaty cover the same subject matter, the Convention controls.
An ex parte I.C.C. award was confirmed in Standard Magesium Corp. v. Otto
Fuchs, K.G., Metallwerke, 251 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1957).
266. Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty with Germany, done Oct. 29,
1954, art. VI (2), 2 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593.
267. ZPO § 1042(a), (c).
268. Id. § 1040.
269. See note 263 supra. 59 Misc. 2d 721,300 N.Y.S. 2d 239 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1969),
aff'd per curiam, 61 Misc. 2d 959, 307 N.Y.S. 2d 381 (App. Div., 1970), appeal dismis-
sed, 27 N.Y. 2d 1033, 264 N.E. 2d 128, 315 N.Y.S. 2d 1033 (1970).
270. In In re Fotochrome, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd sub nom.
Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., Ltd., 517 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1975), a Japanese award in
exactly the same position was before the court. Under Japanese procedures, which were
based on German law, the award had been deposited with the court and had the status of
a "judgment between the parties", Jap. Code of Civ. Proc. § 800; see generally Sanders,
supra note 15, at 89-91. Further judicial review would be required for actual enforceabil-
ity, Jap. Code of Civ. Proc. § 802. The court correctly concluded that the award had not
yet attained the status of a court judgment, at least for the purposes of choosing between
the New York statute on enforcement of foreign money judgments and the New York
Convention.
271. The presence of two sets of arbitration laws, Federal and New York, creates
some conflicts problems on its own. If the award is reduced to judgment, state law is not
preempted by the Convention and will be applied by the federal district court sitting in
diversity. Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F. 2d 1313, 1319 (2d
Cir. 1973). But if the award is not confirmed, and the transaction is within the juris-
dictional scope of federal law under the interstate commerce clause, state law is
preempted and federal law, including the Convention, must be used in both state and
federal courts. A/S.J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Dow Chemical Co., 25 N.Y. 2d 576,
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A far more serious confusion is found in a more recent decision
from the same federal district court. Splosna Plovba of Piran v.
Agrelak Steamship Corp.272 may do much damage if followed uncrit-
ically, and because of its potential influence, the case deserves detailed
analysis.
Splosna Plo vba should have been a routine confirmation proceed-
ing of a London award made pursuant to a standard arbitration clause
in a charter party. The clause provided
[t]hat should any dispute arise between Owners and Charter-
ers, the matter in dispute shall be referred to three persons in
London, one to be appointed by each of the parties hereto,
and the third by the two so chosen; their decision or that of
any two of them, shall be final, and for the purpose of
enforcing any award, this agreement may be made a rule of
the Court. The arbitrators shall be commercial men.273
The parties had changed the venue of the arbitration from New
York to London, and the court concluded that "[b]y doing so the
parties implicitly agreed that British law should govern the arbitration
.. ,274 The court then added that "it was a recognized principle
that the law of the country in which the arbitration takes place governs
.... * ,,275 The court then recited the provisions of the 1950 Arbitra-
tion Act, seemingly under the impression that the English Act should
be applied in federal court as a matter of choice of law. By doing so,
the court violated the elementary principle that a court generally should
apply the procedural law of the forum. 276 The English Act should only
govern in an English court.
Having chosen to apply the English Act, the court misconstrued it
by interpreting section 26,277 the basic provision for obtaining exe-
255 N.E. 2d 774, 307 N.Y.S. 2d 774, aff'd 31 App. Div. 372, 297 N.Y.S. 2d 1011 (1970),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 939 (1970); on the application of state law in Landegger v.
Bayerische Hypotheken und Wechsel Bank, 357 F. Supp. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), see
International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 264, at 157-59.
272. 381 F. Supp. 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
273. Id. at 1369 n.l.
274. Id. at 1370.
275. Id.
276. Article III of the New York Convention reads in part:
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and
enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where
the award is relied on ....
New York Convention, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
277. 1950 Arbitration Act, supra note 13. Section 26 reads as follows:
An award on an arbitration agreement may, by leave of the High Court or
a judge thereof, be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order to the
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quatur, to require confirmation for "finality as to enforcement". 278
The finality of the award under English law is relevant to a foreign
court, but its enforceability is not. Moreover, the Catterall case held in
the analogous situation that the English courts do not insist on an
exequatur for a foreign award to be final as understood in English law.
Thus, as to the finality of the award, the Splosna Plovba court stated
the proper test, whether "the rights and liabilities of the parties have
been definitively settled and cannot be further litigated,' 279 but misap-
plied it.
280
Splosna Plovba presents other errors. The parties, having failed
to obtain a judgment, apparently could have cured this defect by
including "express language providing for entry of judgment in the
arbitration agreement."- 281 Of course, if the award actually had been
insufficiently final, no such language could have saved it. The court
was referring to section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which it
should have consulted from the outset, 282 since this provision was
misapplied as well.
In Varley v. Tarrytown Associates, Inc.,283 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that section 9 requires
some form of consent to entry of judgment, not "explicit language",
for the court to have jurisdiction, and that absent some other indica-
tion, reference to the rules of the American Arbitration Association
would not suffice. The rule in Varley was relaxed recently in IS
278. Splosna Plovba of Piran v. Agrelak Steamship Corp., 381 F. Supp. 1368, 1371
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). The court seems to be confusing finality, which is relevant, with
enforceability, which is not.
279. Id.
280. The court also relied on In re Fotochrome, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y.
1974), in saying that:
[s]imilarly, in the case of a Japanese award, it has been held that such a
foreign arbitration award, where a judgment has been entered in the foreign
country in which the award was made, may be enforced in a United States
Court.
381 F. Supp. at 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). But the district court in Fotochrome expressly left
open the question whether the award had the status of a money judgment, 377 F. Supp.
at 33. However, the court of appeals found that the award did not amount to a judgment.
See note 270, supra. Precisely the same error made in Splosna Plovba ofPiran v. Agrelak
Steamship Corp., 381 F. Supp. 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), was also made in Wright, Graham
& Co. v. Hammond, 41 Ga. App. 738, 154 S.E. 649 (1929), and with respect to a United
States award, in Badat v. East India Trading Co. [64] A.I.R. 538 (P.C. 1964).
281. 381 F. Supp. 1369, 1371 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
282. U.S. Arbitration Act § 9, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1970 & Supp. 1976), provides in relevant
part:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment shall be
entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration. . . , application [for
an order confirming the award] may be made to the United States court. ...
283. 477 F. 2d 208 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc. 284 In Stavborg, the same
court that decided Varley noted that Varley did not require explicit
agreement, and observed that in the instant case another clause in the
contract referred to the finality of the award, and the parties earlier had
sought the aid of the court in appointing an arbitrator. The first factor
also was present in Splosna Plovba, but it is not clear whether it alone
would suffice under Stavborg. Even more recently a federal district
court enforced an award where, as in Stavborg, the agreement pro-
vided for finality of the award, and where the party resisting enforce-
ment had earlier involved the federal court's jurisdiction in a related
prior proceeding.285
The conduct of the parties, however, really need not be con-
sidered since the United States Supreme Court addressed this precise
point briefly, but explicitly, in the early case of Marine Transit Corp.
v. Dreyfus.286 Neither the Varley nor the Stavborg court referred to
this case in resolving the dispute before them. In Dreyfus, the Court
held that when the agreement stipulated that the award should be final
and binding, the court should enter judgment on the award under
section 9, even if the agreement failed to provide for entry of judg-
ment. This is the most reasonable interpretation of section 9; Varley
leaves open a loophole in the statute which is likely to trap many an
agreement, and which Stavborg does not sufficiently close. In any
event, the conclusion seems inescapable that the Varley decision was
erroneous.
Even aside from the Dreyfus case, Varley ought to have been
distinguished in Splosna Plovba. The arbitration agreement in the
latter case contained a "rule of court" clause which would appear to
supply the consent the Varley court had held to be a requirement of
section 9. "Rule of court" clauses are common in maritime arbitra-
tion agreements, and operate to confer jurisdiction on courts.287 The
United States cases so hold in the context of enforcing agreements to
arbitrate; one of the cases noted that "implicit in the agreement to
arbitrate is consent to tthe enforcement of that agreement." 288 A recent
unreported federal decision suggests that a "rule of court" clause may
284. I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1974).
285. Audi NSV Auto Union Aktengesellschaft v. Overseas Motors, 418 F. Supp. 982
(E.D. Mich. 1976). See also, Cohen, A Venue Problem with the Arbitration Clauses
Found in Printed Form Charters, 7 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 541 (1976).
286. 284 U.S. 263, 276 (1932); accord, Murray Oil Products v. Mitsui, 146 F. 2d 381
(2d Cit. 1944).
287. See DOMKE, supra note 7, at 49-50.
288. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 364, 364 (2d Cir. 1964).
Vol. 7
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operate as a waiver of sovereign immunity from execution. 289 It seems
a fortiori that such a clause should confer jurisdiction for the purposes
of section 9. To remove any doubt in Splosna Plovba, the agreement
in that case provided that "for the purposes of enforcing any award,
this agreement may be made a rule of the Court."
290
The court in Splosna Plovba noted that Britain was not a party to
the New York Convention. It is true that under the Convention's
implementing legislation, the old Act applies unless it conflicts with
the newer provisions, 29' but chapter 2 contains its own jurisdiction for
entry of judgment provisions without any consent requirement. 292 It
would appear that section 9 of the 1925 Act has been preempted by the
newer statute in Convention proceedings.
The "double exequatur" problem is actually a question of the
litigation strategy of the parties. If summary proceedings are available
to confirm awards in the rendering forum, it may be advisable to utilize
them if money judgments are more reliable than arbitral awards in
countries where the loser's assets are located. In the case of an award
from a non-Convention state, it would certainly be advisable to obtain
a judgment if enforcement is sought in the United States until either
that state formally accedes to the Convention or the Splosna Plovba
decision is interred. It may be possible for parties to plead the award
and the judgment separately, and give the court a choice as to recogni-
tion. In other cases, as where money judgments are subject to security
requirements, the arbitral award may be safer. If a party has
grounds for challenging either the proceedings or the award, this
would best be done in the courts of the seat of the arbitration, where
judicial supervision is optimal. This much, at least, is clear: the
Convention has not entirely eliminated the need to consult the arbitra-
tion laws of the various countries where the proceedings take place and
where enforcement is likely to be sought.
C. The Law Governing the Arbitration Agreement
1. Separability and Validity Generally. When an arbitration
agreement is a part of a larger contract, should it be treated as distinct
from the rest of the agreement for the purpose of determining its
289. Pan American Tankers and Caribbean Maritime Co., Ltd. v. Directorate Gener-
al, 68 Civ. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (unreported); noted by Domke, The Enforcement of
Maritime Arbitration Agreements with Foreign Governments, 2 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 617
(1971).
290. Splosna Plovba of Piran v. Agrelak Steamship Corp., 381 F. Supp. 1369
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (emphasis added).
291. U.S. Arbitration Act § 208, 9 U.S.C. 203 (1970 & Supp. 1976).
292. U.S. Arbitration Act §§ 203, 207, 9 U.S.C. §§ 203, 207 (1970 & Supp. 1976).
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"proper law"? The "separability" of arbitration clauses from the
principal contract is an issue that has usually arisen in the context of a
claim that the entire agreement was procured by fraud or is tainted by
some other illegality, with the result that the agreement to arbitrate
cannot be enforced. If the arbitration clause is separable, such a
generalized claim will not invalidate the clause and the dispute must be
resolved by the arbitrators.
There are two aspects to the separability problem. The first issue
is whether the contract, including the arbitration clause, is void for
fraud, undue influence, mistake, lack of capacity, or some other
failing. This validity issue should be resolved under the law applicable
to that issue; this will usually be the proper law of the agreement, or
perhaps that of the domicile of the parties for status questions. The
other issue is that by adjudicating on the validity issue, the arbitrator
necessarily rules on his own competence, a matter that more properly
should be ruled upon by the the courts. This latter issue is entirely
different from .the issue of the validity of the agreement, as it concerns
the distribution of jurisdiction between courts and arbitrators. As such,
it is governed by the law of the proceedings.
293
The conventions have treated the problem of the arbitrator's
competence only in terms of the narrower issue of whether he acts
within the terms of his reference under the contract. As such, there are
no choice of law rules in those sections which treat the matter as a
possible defense to enforcement of the award.294 Actually, the party
who raises a fraud claim for obstruction is more likely to do so before
arbitration is commenced than after an award is rendered. The agree-
ment provisions of both the Geneva Protocol 295 and the New York
293. Thus, it is significant that the passage in DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 21,
terming this issue as a matter of the proper law of the agreement was omitted from the
quotation by Viscount Dilhorne in Miller v. Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd.,
[1970] A.C. 583. In Kianta Osakeytio v. Britain and Overseas Trading Co., Ltd., [1954] 1
Lloyd's L.R. 247, 251-52, the Court of Appeal stated in dictum that a foreign law
permitting arbitrators to determine their own competence would not govern in English
courts to the exclusion of the lex fori.
The I.C.C. rule under article 13(4) is sensible: challenges to the arbitrator's juris-
diction must wait until after the award is made. World Bank arbitrators are the judges of
their own competence, see World Bank Convention, supra note 196, art. 44. See
generally Nussbaum, The Separability Doctrine in American and Foreign Arbitration, 17
N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 609 (1940).
294. Geneva Convention, supra note 56, art. 2, para. I (c); New York Convention,
supra note 5, art. V (l)(c).
295. Geneva Protocol, supra note 55, art. 4 provides:
The tribunals of the Contracting Parties, on being seized of a dispute
regarding a contract made between persons to whom Article 1 applies and
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Convention296 permit the courts to retain jurisdiction if the clause is
void or inoperative, and the language arguably includes a finding that
the arbitrator has no jurisdiction over the dispute.
National laws are clearer than the treaties. Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, a claim of fraud must be directed at the arbitration
clause itself to take the issue beyond the arbitrator's competence.
297
Under the English Act, questions of fraud are for the courts,298 but this
rule apparently does not apply to arbitrations under the Conventions.
299
The inquiry into the validity of the arbitration agreement is not
confined to the separability issue. Some commentators have relied on
this doctrine to demonstrate that an arbitration clause can be governed
by a different law than the rest of the contract. 3" The rationale of the
separability doctrine, however, is that the arbitrator should be, at least
provisionally, the judge of validity issues even though his own juris-
diction is implicated. Although there may be reasons why an arbitra-
tion clause is governed by a law other than that of the main contract,
such as the case in which the parties have expressly so agreed, the
separability rationale is quite irrelevant to this issue. Presumptively, at
least, the law governing the contract as a whole also governs the
validity and effect of an arbitration clause contained in it. This issue,
therefore, cannot be separated entirely from that of the proper law of
the contract. For the courts, however, this only begins the inquiry.
All of the international agreements examined here have dealt with
the law governing the arbitration agreement with explicit treatment
occurring in the sections on the enforcement of awards. The Geneva
Convention left the question to the court: the award must have "been
including an arbitration agreement whether referring to present or future
differences which is valid in virtue of the said article and capable of being
carried into effect, shall refer the parties on the application of either to the
decision of the arbitrators.
Such reference shall not prejudice the competence of the judicial tribu-
nals in case the agreement or the arbitration cannot proceed or becomes
inoperative.
296. See note 231 supra.
297. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967).
298. 1950, Arbitration Act, supra note 13, § 24 (2),(3).
299. Radio Publicity (Universal Ltd. v. Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Radiodifu-
sion, [1936] 2 All E.R. 721 (C.A.).
300. Sauser-Hall, supra note 48, at 482. In one I.C.C. case, the arbitrator rescued an
invalid arbitration clause by detaching it from the proper law of the contract. Chronique,
supra note 86, at 910.
The English courts will split a contract for choice of law purposes only for a
"compelling" reason. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 21, at 723.
See also, the careful analysis by a federal district court of an arbitration clause
contained in a charter party, in Michael v. S.S. Thanasis, 311 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Cal.
1970).
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made in pursuance of a submission to arbitration which is valid under
the law applicable thereto." 30 1 There was a consensus at the 1958
United Nations Conference that the Convention should not venture too
deeply into rules of private international law of contracts.
302
This reticence was a healthy one. Even apart from the essentially
procedural nature of the Convention, it is best to leave conflict of laws
issues to development by the courts. The trend of modern conflicts law
is away from rigid rules and towards a more flexible approach under
which the facts of each case are examined closely. Broad rules are poor
substitutes for careful analysis, and occasionally they must be evaded
to reach intelligent results. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
efforts to formulate such rules for the arbitration agreement in the New
York Convention are among its less successful features.
The issue was given to a working party at the Conference, and it
produced a draft similar to the 1927 Convention, 30 3 which eventually
was approved by the Conference. 304 However, the day before the close
of the Conference, the Soviet Union's delegate proposed a reference to
the country in which the award was made.305 The present text was a
Dutch proposal made on the very last day. 306 Article V (1)(a) provides
that recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused if the
losing party proves that
the parties to the agreement referred to in article II were,
under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or
the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the
parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law of the country where the award was made.30 7
The reference to the law applicable to the parties leaves the court
a choice to use contractual or a more traditional domicile test, and the
enshrinement of party autonomy is not objectionable. However, the
residual rule for the law governing the agreement is more dubious. The
Private International Law Committee pointed out that this rule corre-
sponds to the English rule that the substantive law applied to the
contract is usually that of the seat of the arbitration. 30 8 Yet, English
law no longer treats this principle as an inflexible rule, and moreover,
301. Geneva Convention, supra note 56, art. 1, para 2 (3).
302. See, e.g., 22 U.N. ESCOR 7, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.13 (1958).
303. 22 U.N. ESCOR 2, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/L.43 (1958).
304. 22 U.N. ESCOR 16, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.17 (1958).
305. 22 U.N. ESCOR 14, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.23 (1958).
306. 22 U.N. ESCOR 7, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.24 (1958).
307. N.Y. Convention, supra note 5, at 40.
308. Fifth Report, supra note 78, at 30.
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the Convention provision refers not to the site of the arbitration, but to
the state where the award is made. Although the two will usually be the
same, for arbitrations with multiple foreign contacts and more than one
session, this may not be the case. The Convention rule, therefore, may
lead to fortuitous results as well as encourage forum shopping. The site
of the award's rendition has little relevance to the proper law of the
contract; the only argument is that by the time the arbitration reaches
the award stage, the site of the award becomes a major contact.
Subsequent developments, however, are generally inadmissible to
determine the proper law of a contract, a point specifically addressed
in the James Miller case.
30 9
The most objectionable aspect of the provision is that it constricts
the court's choice of law inquiry. This point may be illustrated by the
question of formalities, an issue generally thought to be governed by
the law governing the agreement. Although some legal systems require
formalities to draw an unsophisticated party's attention to an arbitra-
tion provision, between businessmen such requirements only afford
loopholes in enforcement. The Convention provision, by directing the
court's inquiry from the traditional locus regit actum rule, may cause
unexpected difficulties if applied rigidly to formal requirements for
arbitration agreements. One writer suggests that courts ought to read
the provision to include a renvoi, which might lead to application of a
more appropriate law. 310 The court might also infer a contractual
selection of a law which would validate the agreement.
The question of the validity of the arbitration agreement also
arises when a court is requested to stay its proceedings pending
arbitration. At this stage, the determination of the applicable law must
be entirely a contractual one. The 1923 Protocol permits the court to
retain jurisdiction if the agreement or the arbitration "cannot proceed
or becomes inoperable", but leaves the applicable law undeter-
mined.3 1 l The New York Convention uses the language "null and
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed", but again pro-
vides no choice of law rule. 312 In some cases the absence will not be
missed, as for instance, when the court finds the agreement frustrated
or waived by the parties, or if the dispute is frivolous. However,
recourse to choice of law must be made in determining whether the
agreement is "null and void" in the sense of "substantially invalid".
309. James Miller v. Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd., [1970] A.C. 583,
603, 606, 614-15.
310. Pisar, supra note 63, at 343.
311. Geneva Protocol, supra note 55, art. 4.
312. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. 11(3). See note 231 supra.
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One obvious solution is to use the lex fori, but there may be no relevant
contacts with that law. The law of the seat is a possibility, but the seat
may be undetermined. It would be convenient to look to the article V
(1)(a) rules, but their reference to the state where the award is made
renders them inoperative at this stage. The residual rule in both the
award and agreement stages, therefore, should be the usual proper law
approach.31 3 Employed in conjunction with party autonomy, this rule
has the advantage of corresponding to the inquiry a court probably
would make to determine the applicable law in the absence of any
Convention suggestion on the subject. Although the absence of a
choice of law rule in the agreement provision of the New York
Convention has been termed "a serious omission",314 it is submitted
that leaving the inquiry to the court was actually the best solution.
2. The Arbitrability Problem. Most legal systems exclude
certain classes of disputes from arbitration, the sole jurisdiction to
resolve them residing in the courts. Criminal, divorce and probate
matters form common examples.
315
In French law, commercial matters may be arbitrated, but not
those involving questions of goodwill, patent and trademark, bankrupt-
cy, or the validity of corporations. 31 6 German law is basically similar,
but special treatment is given to antitrust issues. Thus, arbitration is
not allowed in cartel agreements, except in those involving foreign
trade; these latter agreements require approval by the Cartel Office.
317
English law is notably liberal on arbitrability; anything relating to
money damages may be arbitrated. 31 8 This includes restraint of trade
questions, provided the award itself does not constitute a restraint.
319
Even some criminal matters are arbitrable. 320 The wide scope that
English law gives arbitration is a reflection of the extensive supervis-
313. Accord, McMahon, supra note 245, at 751; Pisar, supra note 226, at 222. The
applicable law may make a difference when states have limited the Convention's effect
to commercial disputes. The New York Convention, supra note 5, art. 1 (3), permits such
a reservation. The United States has accepted it, but the United Kingdom has not. Two
recent New York decisions support a choice of law analysis of the arbitration provision
by itself. Gangel v. DeGroot, 41 N.Y. 2d 840, 393 N.Y.S. 2d 698 (1977); I.S. Joseph Co.,
Inc. v. Tonfic Aris & Fils, 54 App. Div. 2d 664, 388 N.Y.S. 2d 1 (1976).
314. Quigley, supra note 226, at 1064.
315. See generally DOMKE, supra note 7, ch. 13; RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION, supra
note 7, at 20-24.
316. C. PR. Civ., arts. 1003-28.
317. Law Against Limitation of Competition (W. Germany) (1957), §§ 6,91 (I) & (2),
noted in Sanders, supra note 15, at 235.
318. RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION, supra note 7, at 20.
319. Id. at 22; Birtley District Co-Operative Society Ltd. v. Windy Nook & District
Industrial Co-Operative Society Ltd., [1960] 2 Q.B. 1.
320. RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION, supra note 7, at 24.
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ory jurisdiction of the English courts, especially concerning points of
law.
United States law, conversely, pays for its reluctance to supervise
arbitration with a large body of law on arbitrability, which was largely
created by judges. The most significant cases involve such regulatory
legislation as the securities acts, antitrust laws, and patent and
trademark statutes. 321 Some courts also undoubtedly cling to the ouster
doctrine, but there are other, more trenchant, considerations. Regula-
tory legislation such as the antitrust and securities laws are designed to
take into account the public interest, as well as to adjust the rights of
the immediate parties. The courts, with good reason, fear that these
larger interests may not be considered before purely private tribunals.
Arbitration agreements are capable of being adhesion contracts to the
same extent as any other agreement, and in such cases, arbitration
would leave the economically Weaker party without such benefits of a
judicial forum as discovery, appellate review and treble damages. 322
Antitrust issues are sometimes thought to be too complex for arbi-
trators; this is a curious claim in view of the fact that expertise is a
particular advantage in arbitration and the courts at times have called
upon special masters to help unravel the economic aspects of antitrust
cases.
The clash between foreign arbitration and domestic legislative
policy is the common thread in this developing and significant United
States case law. These decisions largely reflect an admirable inter-
nationalism. However, they lack the doctrinal foundation necessary to
deal with cases yet to come. This foundation can be laid best by using a
conflict of laws approach.
The decision that has prompted recent developments did not
involve an arbitration agreement, but rather its first cousin, the choice
of forum clause. In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company, 323 the
United States Supreme Court was faced with a contract between
United States and German firms which would have directed all litiga-
321. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (securities laws); Aimcee Wholesale Corp.
v. Tomar Products, Inc., 21 N.Y. 2d 621, 237 N.E. 2d 233, 289 N.Y.S. 2d 968, (1965)
(state antitrust laws); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); American Safety
Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1968) (federal antitrust
laws); Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 184 (D.Del. 1930) (patents); Saucy Susan
Products v. Allied Old English Co., 200 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (trademarks
arbitrable). See Symposium-Arbitration and Antitrust, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1069 (1969).
322. Thus, some courts have recognized agreements to arbitrate present antitrust
disputes, since then presumably there is no waiver. See Coenen v. Pressprich & Co., 435
F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1970).
323. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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tion to the English courts. English law, however, would have upheld
an exculpatory clause which the United States courts would have
refused to enforce on public policy grounds. The Court ruled that the
choice of forum clause should be honored absent a strong showing that
it should be set aside. 324 It would not be sufficient merely to show that
enforcement of the clause would lead to a result contrary to that which
would have been compelled under United States law. The Court noted
the importance of contractual stability in international transactions,
and observed that a contrary conclusion would reflect a
parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under
our laws and in our courts. . . . We cannot have trade and
commerce in world markets and international waters exclu-
sively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in
our courts.
32 5
The Bremen decision thus took the crucial first step in the conflict
of laws analysis; it recognized that when a transaction has bona fide
contacts with more than one jurisdiction, foreign law may displace the
law of the forum even when the latter is founded on notions of public
policy. Bremen's progeny rest on narrower grounds. Of these, Scherk
v. Alberto-Culver Co. 326 merits extended treatment.
The facts in Scherk exemplify the modern economic setting of
international trade arbitration. Alberto-Culver, a United States multi-
national firm, purchased from Scherk, a German national, three cos-
metics firms incorporated under the laws of Germany and Leichten-
stein. The sales contract was negotiated in the United States, Germany
and England; it was signed in Austria, and the transaction was closed
in Switzerland. The agreement contained warranties that Scherk's
trademarks were unencumbered, as well as the I.C.C. arbitration and
choice of law clauses discussed previously.
327
After the closing, there appeared to be a shortage in Scherk's
inventory of European trademarks. When Scherk refused Alberto-
Culver's offer to rescind, Alberto-Culver went to federal district court
in Chicago alleging that the warranties covering the trademarks con-
stituted material misstatements and therefore violated the antifraud
provisions of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. 328
324. Id. at 7. This is basically similar to English law. See note 30, supra.
325. 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
326. 417 U.S. 506 (1974), noted in 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 366 (1975).
327. 417 U.S. 506, 509 n.l (1974).
328. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970) and rule lOb-5
promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5 (1976). The purchase of Scherk's firms
was in the form of shares of stock.
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The central issue in the litigation was whether the Supreme
Court's decision in Wilko v. Swan, 329 which held that an agreement to
arbitrate future disputes arising under a contract to purchase securities
is unenforceable, was controlling. Wilko appears to rest on statutory
interpretation; the Court construed section 14 of the 1933 Securities
Act,33 ° which voids any "stipulation or provision [to] waive com-
pliance with any provision of this subchapter," as including access to
the federal courts. The Court held that an agreement to arbitrate future
disputes was such a waiver. Behind these interpretations, however,
lurked the fear that the policies furthered by the Securities Act might
not receive adequate consideration in arbitration. Wilko, then, was a
classic arbitrability case.
Wilko could have been distinguished in Scherk on the basis of the
slightly differing provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, or
by deciding that the facts did not present a Securities Act issue, or by
ruling that Wilko was not applicable to parties of equal bargaining
position. Instead, the Court squarely faced the difficult issue of
whether Wilko applied to transactions with predominantly foreign
contacts. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority with Chief Justice
Burger, and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist answered in the
negative, reversing both courts below.
The spirit of Bremen suffuses the majority opinion. This was
clearly a bona fide international transaction:
Finally, and most significantly, the subject matter of the
contract concerned the sale of business enterprises organ-
ized under the laws of and primarily situated in European
countries, and whose activities were largely, if not entirely,
directed to European markets."'
An arbitration clause "is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum
selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit, but also the
procedure to be used in resolving the dispute." 3 32 The Court empha-
sized the magnified significance of such contractual provisions in
international trade and found that the preservation of the federal forum
held so important in Wilko, a purely domestic case, is irrelevant in
transactions with such potential for multiforum litigation. This, in
essence, is the majority's reasoning: Wilko does not apply in the
international setting; rather, Bremen controls.
However, the majority opinion does not answer entirely the
elaborate dissent by Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Brennan,
329. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
330. Securities Act of 1933, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970).
331. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515 (1974).
332. Id. at 519.
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White and Marshall. In view of the closeness of the decision, it is
necessary to show why the dissent was mistaken. A conflicts approach
can decisiyely answer Justice Douglas and place a firm foundation
under the correct conclusion reached by the majority.
One thread running through Justice Douglas' opinion is a deep
mistrust of arbitration. He refered to "the uncertainty of arbitration on
a foreign soil." 333 He feared that an "arbitral court may improperly
interpret the substantive protections of the [antifraud rules],334 and if it
does, its error will not be reviewable as would the error of a federal
court," 335 and referred to the majority's recognition of the importance
of contractual forum selection in international trade as "supported only
by speculation." ,336 The most that can be said for arbitration, according
to Justice Douglas, is that "it may be the superior way of settling some
disagreements.' '337 This attitude is, at best uninformed. More to the
point, judicial suspicion of arbitration has long been legislatively
overruled.
Justice Douglas also invoked the spectre of the "defrauded citizen
being forced to arbitration in Paris to vindicate his rights," ' 338 after
signing an adhesion contract containing an arbitration clause. It is
difficult to sympathize with a giant multinational, so the Justice's
solicitude was transferred to Alberto-Culver's stockholders, whose
equity would be diluted when Alberto-Culver met the perils of "a far-
off forum". 339 This is not merely a mistrust of arbitration, but of
foreign law and justice as well. This attitude, as the majority notes,
"demeans the standards of justice elsewhere in the world, and un-
necessarily exalts the primacy of [United States] law over the laws of
other countries." 340 It is singularly misplaced in Scherk, as the I.C.C.
was organized as much by citizens and representatives of the United
States as by those of any other nation. 341 More significantly, there was
no adhesion contract in Scherk; therefore this point only muddies the
waters. Inequality of bargaining power, moreover, is precisely the sort
of consideration that the courts may properly take into account under
the public policy sections of the Convention.
342
333. Id. at 533 (dissenting opinion).
334. See note 328, supra.
335. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 532 n. 1l (1974) (dissenting opin-
ion). But the agreement contained a choice of law clause; see notes 142 and 217 supra.
336. Id. at 529 n.7.
337. Id. at 526.
338. Id. at 529.
339. Id. at 533.
340. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 n.ll (1974).
341. Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 825-31.
342. See text accompanying notes 376-378 infra.
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However, all this is only peripheral to Justice Douglas' principal
contention, which was that the securities laws, as interpreted in Wilko,
void future dispute arbitration clauses in securities cases, and "no
exception is made for contracts which have an international charac-
ter." 34 3 This is the crux of the opinion, and it is elaborated in two
ways. First, the Scherk contract was not really "international", 344 and
second, the securities laws would apply to it even if it were. The first
contention is betrayed by its language; "international contracts",
according to Justice Douglas, is a "talisman" 345 that may lead to a
"diluted version' 346 of United States law, although there were some
34 7
"incidental ' 348 international contacts in the Scherk contract. The
dissenters noted that some of the negotiations took place in the United
States and "the full economic impact of the alleged fraud occurred
within the United States." 349 This will always be the case, however,
when a United States victim of an alleged fraud chooses his home as a
forum.
Even if the agreement in Scherk were "international", Justice
Douglas claimed that it was "not disputed" 350 that the United States
securities laws may be held to govern even when much of the objec-
tionable conduct takes place outside the United States. Although he
admitted that "[flederal jurisdiction under the 1934 Act will attach
only to some international transactions, ' 351 Justice Douglas cited in
support of this contention the considerable case law dealing with the
extraterritorial reach of United States securities legislation.352 The
majority expressly abstained from ruling on whether the transaction in
Scherk was beyond the reach of United States law since the question
was not appealed.353 Elucidating this point is crucial in appreciating
Scherk and the arbitrability problem generally. Although the problem
343. 417 U.S. 506, 524 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
344. Id. at 528-29.
345. Id. at 529.
346. Id. at 531.
347. Id. at 534.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 530 n.8.
350. Id. at 533.
351. Id. at 534.
352. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); S.E.C. v. United
Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d
200 (2d Cir. 1968), mod. en banc 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 215
(1968). Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,443 (2d Cir. 1945);
United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),
enforcing 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (antitrust laws); ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519
F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied sub nom. Bersch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
353. 417 U.S. 506, 516 n.9 (1974).
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of the extraterritorial application of public law has a literature of its
own 3 54 and cannot be considered here in detail, a brief discussion will
show its relevance to the present analysis.
The securities acts are similar to the antitrust laws in that they are
"public laws" which monitor a class of transactions within a certain
legislative framework. As expressions of national legislative policy,
355
they are mandatory and regulatory in nature, and may be applied only
to transactions with a close enough connecton with the state whose
policies they further. The principal conflicts consequence is that,
because they are territorial in nature, public laws can not be enforced
abroad.356
The practice in the United States respecting extraterritorial appli-
cation and enforcement of its securities and antitrust laws has been
exceptionally expansive, and has occasioned a good deal of criticism
354. Bator, Extraterritorial Application of Law: U.S. Securities Law, [1970] PROC.
AM. SOC. INT'L L. 141; Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the U.S. Antitrust
Laws, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 146 (1957) [hereinafter cited Jennings]; Jones, An Interest
Analysis Approach to Extraterritorial Application of Rule lOb-5, 52 TEX. L. REV. 983
(1974); Trautman, The Role of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the International Reach of
American Regulatory Legislation, 22 OHIO S. L.J. 586 (1961). The discussion here,
though, is particularly indebted to Mann, The Conflict of Laws and Public Law, 132
REC. DES COURS 109 (197 1-1) and Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International
Law, Ill REC. DES COURS 1 (1964-1).
355. But not public policy. See text accompanying notes 376-378 infra.
356. Huntington v. Attrill, [1893] A.C. 150; Banco de Brasil v. Israel Commodity
Co.. 12 N.Y. 3d 371, 190 N.E. 2d 235 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964). According
to the Huntington case, [1893] A.C. at 161, there can be no enforcement by the state, or
by "someone representing the public". This point is significant in the present context
since private claims based on regulatory legislation are well known to United States law,
but not English law. A recent illustration of this is Schemmer v. Property Resources Ltd.,
[1974] 3 W.L.R. 406 (Ch. D.). There, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York appointed Schemmer to act as a receiver of the defendant's
property and to institute any proceedings necessary in the English courts, pursuant to
proceedings in the United States instituted by the Securities and Exchange Commission
involving an alleged securities fraud. The application to the Chancery Division was
rejected on two grounds. First, the district court had no in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant; and second, the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act, under which the Commis-
sion operates, is "penal" and therefore not enforceable in England. The first ground is
orthodox doctrine, but as to the second, Judge Goulding inaccurately characterized the
issue. The Act is not "penal" in any meaningful sense. Cf. Huntington v. Attrill, 146
U.S. 657 (1892). This case involved a straight forward attempt to enforce a public law
extraterritorially and should not have been entertained by the English courts. As Mann
notes in The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, I l1 REC. DES COURS 1, 95-108,
127-50 (1964-1), this is a jurisdictional issue.
However, Judge Goulding added in dictum that a private claim based on the
securities laws might be entertained. The issue, then, is whether this would be con-
sidered "enforcement". Cf. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). The question of
the "use" of foreign public law in this context is a jurisdictional question. Cf. Mann, The
Conflict of Laws and Public Law, 132 REC. DES COURS 109, 182-96 (1971-I).
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by foreign commentators. 357 The United States cases cited by Justice
Douglas in Scherk have treated the matter as one of subject matter
jurisdiction, and none of them have seriously considered the possibility
of using foreign law, public or otherwise. Judge Friendly in Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,358 dealt with an asser-
tion that under choice of law principles, English fraud law would
govern if the case were in a state court. He commented that as long as
international law permitted the assumption of jurisdiction, the forum
could displace foreign law with its own. 359 United States courts,
therefore, have asked whether there are sufficient contacts to assert
subject matter jurisdiction, but not whether those contacts might re-
quire use of foreign law. Thus, the effect of a negative answer to the
first question would be dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, a path most
courts are notably reluctant to follow.
In spite of the Scherk majority's protestations, the case must be
considered a limitation on the extraterritorial application of the United
States securities laws, and a particular limitation on the judicial gloss
in Wilko v. Swan. The result of Scherk is that the nonarbitrability of
securities disputes, an aspect of the law regulating the securities
industry, does not apply to those transactions beyond the jurisdictional
reach of that law. That the majority rested its conclusion solely on the
international nature of the transaction and not on any of the narrower
grounds, such as the inequality of bargaining power, confirms this
conclusion. Justice Douglas understood that the central issue in this
case actually was whether United States law governed the transaction,
but he begged the question by simply assuming that it did and by
claiming that the provision in question recognized "no exception for
fraudulent dealings which incidentally have some international fac-
tors. '' 
360
The majority, however, leaves itself open to the charge that
"international contract" is a "talisman" by backing away from the
logical implication of its contacts evaluation, which is that the 1934
Act does not determine in which forum the alleged fraud must be
resolved. For this reason, the majority opinion is not entirely convinc-
ing in its distinguishing of Wilko by invoking the spirit of Bremen.
Even if the Court were unwilling to rule explicitly on the extraterrito-
357. Some doubt was cast upon the rule of no enforcement of foreign public policy
in Banco Frances eBrasilieorS.A. v. Doe, 36 N.Y. 2d 592, 596, 331 N.E.2d 502, 506, 730
N.Y.S. 2d 534, 539 (1975). Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 11I
REC. DES COURS I (1964-I); Jennings, supra note 354.
358. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
359. Id.
360. 417 U.S. 506, 534 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
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riality of the securities laws, it could have strengthened its opinion
considerably if it had articulated the significance of the contacts in-
volved. In this manner the Court would have disclosed the proper
weight to be given to the nationality of the defrauded party. In view of
the result in Scherk, this apparently is not crucial. The Court also left
unanswered the proper weight that should be given to the nationality of
the supposed perpetrator, the site of the acts or the site of their
"effects", and the state where the relevant markets are located. The
contacts inquiry is a highly factual one, and Scherk can easily be
distinguished on this basis. At least the decision has clearly limited the
grounds of contention to the one critical question of whether the
transaction is connected closely enough with the United States to
permit invocation of United States public law.
To recapitulate, arbitrability is generally a matter of the public
laws of different states, and in particular, of the rules as to the
permissible forums in which disputes involving those laws may be
heard. Scherk demonstrates the territorial limits of the arbitrability
doctrine. A more recent decision presented similar problems, but at the
award stage.
In Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors, Inc.,361 a United
States court was faced with an award made under German law, which
permits arbitration of antitrust issues. The issue was whether the court
should recognize the award or permit relitigation on the merits, pre-
sumably under United States antitrust law. The plaintiff, a Michigan
dealer of German cars, had an exclusive dealership contract with the
manufacturers. All disputes were to be arbitrated in Zurich, Switzer-
land. Overseas Motors, after being squeezed out of its dealership, filed
suit in a Michigan federal court and alleged violations of various
United States antitrust laws. The manufacturers served notice of intent
to submit the claim to arbitration, and Overseas Motors' motion to stay
the arbitration on arbitrability grounds was denied.362 Overseas Motors
did not participate in the arbitration, and the panel made findings of
fact and law in favor of the manufacturers.
The district court was prepared to grant res judicata effect to those
findings of the arbitrators which dealt solely with the alleged breach of
the contract. If the claim had been one based on the invalidity of the
contract itself under the antitrust laws,36 3 however, the issue would
361. 315 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
362. Id. at 507. An appeal from the denial of the stay was consolidated with the
instant case.
363. German antitrust law is highly developed. See, e.g., Markert, Recent Devel-
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have been "within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court [and]
no res judicata qua claim preclusion could be based on any such
proceeding." 364 The court in dealing with issue preclusion explained:
Because the public interest was neither represented nor con-
sidered in the arbitration proceedings, which resolved a
purely private dispute, plaintiff may now be afforded an
opportunity to relitigate certain previously decided issues.
These issues to whose determination a public interest at-
taches may be termed "antitrust issues," and as to them
there can be no collateral estoppel.365
In sum, although there was no general res judicata available
because the causes of action were different, the United States policy
denying arbitrability to antitrust issues would be given effect and
would permit relitigation of those issues under United States law. In an
otherwise meticulous opinion, no consideration was given to the possi-
bility that the United States antitrust laws might not govern the transac-
tion either because it was beyond the territorial reach of those provi-
sions, or because the choice of law clause validly subjected the rela-
tionship to German law. The first argument would have been doomed
on the facts in Overseas Motors, since the full performance of the
dealership and the effects of the alleged illegalities were almost entire-
ly within the United States. Scherk, therefore, is easily distinguish-
able. Later cases, of course, may not be as clear. With regard to the
choice of law clause, although the Swiss arbitrators specifically found
that German law applied, the court simply noted that this was a matter
of law "as to which there can be technically no estoppel.' 366 The court
did not consider the most interesting issue of whether the choice of law
clause could validly displace United States antitrust law. The
stipulated choice was hardly unreasonable, and there was no disparity
in bargaining power. If the court had honored the clause, or the
transaction had been found, under a Scherk-type analysis, to be be-
yond the jurisdictional reach of United States legislative policy, then
the court should have granted finality to the award as to all issues.
The choice of law stipulation in Overseas Motors suggests that
there is more than one way to approach the arbitrability problem. If
arbitrability is treated as a matter concerning the substantive validity of
the agreement, it would be governed by the proper law of the agree-
ment whether determined by a choice of law or under the "real and
opments in German Antitrust Law, 43 FORD. L. REV. 697 (1975). Owing to the choice of
law clause, the arbitrator's determination would have been made under German Law.
364. 315 F. Supp. 499, 518 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
365. Id. at 520-21.
366. Id. at 524.
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substantial connection" or interest analysis tests. This is the approach
of Mezger, who terms the question of the law governing arbitrability a
'pseudo-problem". 367 Less usefully, arbitrability can be considered to
be governed by the law of the proceedings, since it implicates the
division of jurisdiction between courts and arbitrators. Yet, neither of
these techniques alters the fundamental issue, which is whether the
transaction in question bears a close enough relationship to the forum
to permit invocation of its own public laws.
368
Having developed this analysis, it only remains to note that it has
been explicitly rejected by the New York Convention. Article V(2)
contains two defenses in addition to those in article V(1) that the court
may raise sua sponte if they are not raised by the party opposing
confirmation. The first, which follows the 1927 Geneva Convention,
provides that recognition and enforcement of an award may be refused
if "the subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the laws of that country [where enforcement is
sought]." 369 This provision applies only to awards, and the arbitrabili-
ty issue at the agreement stage is considered under article 11(1), which
contains no conflicts rule. 370 However, article II(2)(a) expressly au-
thorizes a court to test arbitrability under the law of the forum, whose
sole connection with the dispute may be that the loser's assets are
located there. The United Kingdom's implementing legislation reason-
ably omits the conflicts rule, but then arbitrability quesions rarely arise
in English law. The provision is a serious loophole for enforcement in
states, such as the United States, with strong arbitrability policies.
This section was also considered in Parsons & Whittemore Over-
seas Co. v. Societe Generales De L'Industrie Du Papier.371 Although
the court found no necessity to decide on the basis of the weak record
before it, it helpfully noted that
it may well be that the special considerations and policies
underlying a "truly international agreement" call for a nar-
367. Mezger, supra note 18, at 247.
368. Quaere, though whether a claim that the dispute is nonarbitrable under a
foreign law should be accepted by a court. See notes 356 supra and 389 infra.
369. New York Convention, supra note 5, at 42. (emphasis added)
370. See note 231 supra. In Scherk, the Court significantly noted that
[iln their discussion of this Article, the delegates voiced frequent concern that
courts of signatory countries in which an agreement to arbitrate is sought to be
enforced should not be permitted to decline enforcement of such agreements
on the basis of parochial views of their desirability or in a manner that would
diminish the mutually binding nature of the agreements.
417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974). The Court cited HAIGHT, supra note 226, at 24-28.
371. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. Inc. v. Societe Generale de L'industrie du
Papier (RAKTA) 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
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rower view of non-arbitrability [sic] in the international than
the domestic context.
372
In fact, the analysis in Scherk applies equally to the contractual and
award stages of arbitration litigation.
Curiously, the Convention played a positive role in one of the
most difficult of the arbitrability cases, although the issue was not
identified as such. In Fotochrome Inc. v. Copal Co., Ltd., 373 a United
States firm contracted to buy cameras from a Japanese firm which was
not subject to United States in personam jurisdiction. A dispute arose
and went to arbitration in Japan, but before the award was rendered,
Fotochrome withdrew and filed for bankruptcy in a United States
district court. The key issue was whether the bankruptcy court could
retry the merits of the dispute. As was the case in Overseas Motors
and contrary to the situation in Scherk, Fotochrome arose at the award
stage. The case in favor of resolving this dispute in federal court was
significantly stronger than it was in Overseas Motors; whereas the
arbitrability rule in the latter case was a judge made extension of the
antitrust laws, the settlement of the debtor's affairs in one consolidated
proceeding with minimum prejudice to his creditors is at the heart of
the bankruptcy laws. Yet, the court determined that because there was
no jurisdiction to enjoin the arbitration, the Convention mandated
giving full effect to the award as a final determination on the merits.
If the court in Overseas Motors had examined the Convention, it
undoubtedly would have relied on article V(2)(a). Although the objec-
tion to finality in Fotochrome is not one of nonarbitrability in the
context of that case, the underlying issue was the same, that is,
whether the court could retry the merits. Furthermore, although the
Fotochrome court instructed Copal to seek confirmation of its award
under the Convention, the determination that the award was a final
adjudication would preclude any nonarbitrability defense under article
V(2)(a) .
Fotochrome may not be applicable too far beyond its context of
bankruptcy law, because the legal issues involved in a retrial in
bankruptcy court probably would not differ from those resolved in the
arbitration. This would not be so in antitrust cases. However, it does
signify that the command of the Convention that arbitral awards be
recognized "as binding","' limits domestic reexamination of foreign
372. 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
373. Fotochrome Inc. v. Copal Co., Ltd., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
374. In In re Fotochrome, Inc. itself, such a determination would also be the law of
the case.
375. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. III.
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awards even when important domestic legislation seems to mandate
resolution exclusively in the courts. This is the crux of the arbitrability
issue. In its widest application, Fotochrome may be useful in persuad-
ing a court to refrain from applying the unfortunate arbitrability provi-
sion of the Convention.
An interesting arbitrability problem was recently faced by the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Hanes Corporation v.
Millard.376 In Hanes, French citizens, the assignors of an expired
United States patent, initiated I.C.C. arbitration against Hanes, their
assignee, claiming unpaid royalties were due under the assignment
contract. Hanes brought suit in the District of Columbia Federal
District Court, requesting a declaratory judgment that the products for
which royalties were sought were not covered by the patent, and that
the assignors' claims were barred by the relevant United States statute
of limitations. The district court found that the District of Columbia
limitation applied and barred the claims. The circuit court found
crucial differences between the two claims which affected the appro-
priateness of arbitration: The statute of limitations question was essen-
tially contractual in nature, the court ruled, and it therefore came
within the scope of the broad arbitration clause. After an enlightening
discussion of the importance of arbitration for international contractual
disputes, the court held that declaratory judgment should not have been
granted on this half of the case.
The other claim, that the underlying patent did not cover the
process in question, presented other considerations. It was true that the
patent had expired, which militated against exercise of the court's
declaratory judgment authority. Yet, to permit the arbitrators to decide
questions of the patent's scope and validity could thwart the "strong
interest" 377 of having such questions resolved in the federal courts.
The court's more fundamental misgivings, however, were directed at
the arbitral process itself; patent related issues
involve complex and difficult questions in applying an ex-
tremely technical body of law. They are questions that may
be unfamiliar to arbitrators, particularly if members of the
panel are not lawyers or are citizens of a foreign country. In
addition, the expertise of arbitrators has always lain in re-
solving, perhaps by way of compromise, contractual dis-
putes rather than in interpreting the import of complicated
federal legislation.378
376. Hanes Corporation v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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Furthermore, a foreign court, equally unfamiliar with United States
patent law, would be most likely to review an I.C.C. award. Thus, the
court concluded, declaratory relief would have been appropriate on
this claim if the district court had reached the issue.
The arbitrability of the validity and scope of a patent calls for
different and more complex considerations than the simpler limitations
issue, but the court's treatment leaves several questions unanswered.
Does not the international nature of the dispute enhance rather than
detract from the desirability of arbitration of the patent issues? This
was the court's approach to the limitations claim. It is also unclear why
the court believed I.C.C. arbitration would be inadequate, especially
since experts on United States patents could be appointed as arbi-
trators. Patent disputes are not inherently unsuited to arbitration.
379
The situation in Hanes actually was very similar to that in
Scherk, in that there was the clash between international arbitration
and United States judge-made law confining disputes involving federal
legislation to the United States courts. The claims in Hanes were
primarily contractual ones incidentally involving the scope of the
underlying patent. The court need not have been drawn into the case
law involving arbitrability of patent validity; instead, a Scherk-type
analysis of the contacts that the dispute has with the jurisdictions
involved would have been more appropriate. Hanes demonstrates how
arbitrability restrictions permit United States parties to race into United
States courts with pleadings which frame the case around nonarbitrable
issues.
D. Public Policy
Public policy has a role in the conflict of laws, but it is a narrow
one. All too often public policy is invoked when courts are unable or
unwilling to articulate their rationale. In this guise it is notorious as a
cloak for analysis and a facade for parochialism. The only point to be
made here, as it has been made elsewhere, 38 is that in dealing with
379. See Cavicchi v. Mohawk Mfg. Co., 526 App. Div. 1069, 12 N.Y.S. 2d 360
(1939), aff'd., 281 N.Y. 629, 22 N.E. 2d 179 (1939), rearg. denied, 281 N.Y. 669 (1939),
app. dism., 308 U.S. 522 (1939), rearg. denied, 308 U.S. 639 (1940).
380. 2 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 582 (1947); Paulsen
and Sovern, "'Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 1003-04
(1956); DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 21, at 73:
In general it is certainly untrue that contracts governed by foreign law will
not be enforced in England if they are contrary to some imperative rule of
English domestic law which the parties to an English contract cannot disre-
gard.
But cf. Rousillon v. Rousillon, [1880] Ch. D. 351 (dictum, restraint of trade).
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forum regulatory legislation, the inquiry is whether the transaction in
question bears a relationship with the forum appropriate enough to
justify its application. Courts have relied too often on a public policy
"exception" in choice of law, when they actually were subjecting a
basically local transaction to local mandatory law.
This distinction finds implicit support in the New York Conven-
tion. In addition to the arbitrability provision previously reviewed,
article V(2)(b) permits a court to refuse recognition and enforcement of
an award if enforcement "would be contrary to the public policy of
[the forum] country." The analogous provision in the Geneva Conven-
tion also required that the award not be contrary to "the principles of
the law of the country where it is sought to be relied upon," 381 an
unfortunate provision which authorized the court not only to review the
award for errors of law as applied by the arbitrator, but also for
inconsistency with forum law. The omission of this phrase is an
important improvement in the New York Convention, although com-
mentators have differed as to whether its absence acts to broaden or
narrow the public policy defense as it stands.
382
The history of this provision at the Conference is not very helpful.
It occasioned relatively little controversy, no doubt because some sort
of public policy reservation is inevitable in such an agreement. A
proposal was made to add "fundamental principles of law [ordre
public]. "383 Such a clause would have invited review on law while
introducing confusion as to the meaning of "fundamental". The pro-
posal, fortunately, was rejected. The French and German delegates
thought, contrary to the approach developed here, that arbitrability
issues would be subsumed under public policy and objected to article
V(2)(a) on this ground.
384
Some further definition, then, is needed. In the Parsons & Whit-
temore case, 385 the losing party invoked article V(2)(b) to oppose
enforcement of an award rendered after it abandoned a construction
project in Egypt during the 1967 Middle East War when the United
States Agency for International Development withdrew funding for the
contract. Parsons argued that these manifestations of United States
foreign policy impelled its abandonment of the project, and that an
381. Geneva Convention, supra note 56, art. 1, para. 2 (e).
382. Compare Quigley, supra note 226, at 1070-71, with Contini, supra note 57, at
304.
383. HAIGHT, supra note 226, at 67-71.
384. 22 U.N. ESCOR 15, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.17 (1958).
385. Parsons & Whittmore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale de L'industrie du
Papier (RAKTA) 508 F.2d 969 (2nd Cir. 1974).
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award premised on any obligation to continue the construction would
be contrary to public policy. The court had no difficulty in rejecting the
defense:
To read the public policy defense as a parochial device
protective of national political interests would seriously
undermine the Convention's utility. Rather, a circumscribed
public policy was contemplated by the Convention's framers
and every indication is that the United States, in acceding to
the Convention, meant to subscribe to this supranational
emphasis.386
Significantly, the court emphasized the pro-enforcement thrust of
the Convention and formulated a narrow definition of public policy:
Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on
this basis only where enforcement would violate the forum
state's most basic notions of morality and justice.387
Because the Convention has separate provisions for such objec-
tions as lack of notice or due process 388 and arbitrability, the Parsons
& Whittemore construction is the only one supported by the document
as a whole. Furthermore, it accords with the standard United States
rule for foreign judgments. 389 The English definition of public policy
by comparison is extremely narrow for all purposes.
390
386. 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
387. Id. The court referred to Cardozo's classic formulation in Loucks v. Standard
Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, I11, 120 N.E. 198, 202, 159 N.Y.S. 282 (1918); the
test is whether enforcement "would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some
prevalent conception of morals, some deep-seated tradition of the commonwealth." See
also Mann, Conflict of Laws and Public Law, 132 REC. DES COURS 109, 133 (1971-I).
388. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V (1)(b). In Biotronik Mess-und
Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument Co., 415 F. Supp. 133
(D.N.J. 1976), the court rejected an argument that a defaulting party may vacate an
award for "fraud" under § 10(b) of the Federal Arbitration Act where the party did not
appear at the hearings and the victorious party failed to present certain evidence
favorable to the defaulting party. The award was covered by the Convention, and the
court found a rejection of a Convention "public policy" defense a fortiori. The court
also rejected an argument that the defaulting party came within the article V(1)(b)
language permitting refusal to enforce an award where a party "was otherwise unable to
present his case."
389. In an interesting recent case, the New York Supreme Court rejected an attempt
to halt an arbitration on the grounds that foreign public policy, in the form of Italian
exchange control regulations, rendered the underlying contract illegal. Matter of Molino
e Pastificio di Ponte San Giovanni S.p.A., N.Y.L.J., July 8, 1977, at 6, col. 2. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (1971), under which the public policy for
refusal must be stronger than that would disallow a claim on a foreign cause of action
under section 90, or a refusal to choose foreign law under section 188.
390. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 21, at 71. On the French notion of "ordre public
international", see Goldman, supra note 54, at 432-43.
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The concept of public policy does not really admit of precise
definition, but it must serve as a residual category, for instance, for
cases of laws offensive to basic human rights or perhaps for isolated
instances of unusual individual hardship. The United States Supreme
Court in Scherk suggested, although it did not decide, that the fraud
alleged in that case "presumably" could have been raised under article
V(2)(b) at the enforcement level. 391 The presence of an adhesion
contract might be a more legitimate inquiry.
A true public policy defense to an arbitration agreement was
almost presented in a recent district court decision, Antco Shipping
Co., Ltd. v. Sidermar S.p.A.392 In Antco Shipping, a charter party
signed in 1973 between a Bahamanian charterer and an Italian ship-
owner provided for transport of crude oil from Mediterranean ports to
Caribbean or, at Antco's option, United States ports. The contract
excluded Israeli ports as points of loading. Incorporated into the
agreement was a standard London or New York arbitration clause.
Antco, the charterer, refused further performance after mid- 1974,
and Sidemar sought arbitration in New York. Antco, in opposition,
claimed that the exclusion of Israeli ports rendered the contract unen-
forceable under the Export Administration Act of 1969 393 and regula-
tions promulgated thereunder. 394 These provisions declared "restric-
tive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by foreign coun-
tries against other countries friendly to the United States" contrary to
United States policy, and making compliance with them, in certain
cases, subject to penalties or reporting requirements. Antco also relied
upon the New York antiboycott law, which in essence makes boycot-
ting or blacklisting of a discriminatory nature "an unlawful dis-
criminatory practice".
395
Although the facts present an interesting potential for a clash
between the antiboycott provisons and the pro-arbitration policy of the
New York Convention, the restriction in question failed to join the
issue. The court observed that in view of then mounting tensions in the
Mid-East, Sidemar's characterization of the exclusion as a precaution
against war risks, was sufficiently plausible to preclude judicial notice
that the clause signified boycott compliance. Although the court did
not refer to them, the Export Administration Regulations lend some
391. 417 U.S. 506, 519 n.14 (1974).
.392. 417 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, No. 76-7363 (2d Cir. Feb. 16, 1977).
393. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402 (5) (1969).
394. 15 C.F.R. § 369 (1976).
395. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (13) (1976).
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support to this interpretation. Under section 369.3(b)(v) of the regula-
tions, a requirement imposed by a boycotting country, that goods not
be shipped on a carrier that stops in a port in a boycotted country prior
to arriving at its destination in the boycotting country, is not con-
sidered a "restrictive practice" under the Act, but instead it is deemed
a precaution against confiscation.
The court placed more emphasis on the different ground that the
contract was essentially for import, if anything, and that the Export
Administration Act controls only exports. The court noted that the
statutory statement of policy is not limited to export transactions, but
emphasized that the implementation of that policy, both in the statute
and the regulations, is so limited. Nonetheless, it was only the state-
ment of policy that was implicated in Antco Shipping, not its im-
plementation; besides, other legislation, such as the antiboycott provi-"
sions of the 1976 Tax Reform Act,396 provide a broader source of
relevant public policy.
397
The court finally analyzed the Convention's provisons on public
policy, as well as the Scherk and Parsons & Whittemore decisions,
and found no obstacle to an order directing arbitration.
Antco Shipping would have been a much closer case if the
offending clause would have been a true boycott requirement under the
Export Administration Regulations. For instance, if Antco had been
required in an export contract not to use blacklisted insurers, a report to
the Commerce Department concerning the request would have been
required, but Antco would not have been prohibited from complying
with the request. 398 A blatantly discriminatory request, such as one
relating to the religion of Antco's employees, not only would be
reportable, but compliance would be illegal.399 Such clauses would
clearly implicate public policy. The court in Antco Shipping usefully
construed the "illegality" aspect of the Convention's public policy
defense to
require a showing by the party resisting enforcement of the
agreement that the essence of the obligation or remedy is
396. Int. Rev. Code §§ 908, 951-952, 995, 999 added by Tax Reform Act of 1976, §§
1061-1064, Pub. L. No. 94-455 (1976).
397. Legislation to extend and to strengthen its antiboycott provisions was enacted
on June 22, 1977. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 95
Stat. 235 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 et. seq. (1977)). This enactment may raise
interesting problems to the effect of changes in public policy on the validity of executed
contracts.
398. 15 C.F.R. § 369.4 (1976).
399. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2 (1976).
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prohibited by a pertinent statute or some other declaration of
public policy. 4"
The effect of this formulation is that arbitration may be denied
only when the underlying performance of the contract is illegal. Under
this standard, arbitrators would retain jurisdiction to consider questions
of public policy where the taint is incidental rather than essential to the
performance of the obligation. Furthermore, the obvious separability
aspect is answered similarly in that public policy objections do not
vitiate the arbitration agreement itself unless the objection is so funda-
mental that entire contract is voided. It seems this question must be
decided on the facts of each case.
Having examined how the courts have applied public law and
public policy to arbitration, the question remains how arbitrators should
apply the same considerations to the disputes before them. Justice
Douglas in Scherk doubted that the I.C.C. arbitrators would consider
the standard of United States securities laws.
However, arbitrators who are appointed by the parties are not
charged with effectuating the state interests of any particular nation.
They are therefore in a better position than any national court to
determine which nation's public law, if any, merits application to the
dispute. Compunctions about the use of "foreign" public law have no
place in international arbitration.
Beyond this, arbitrators should be free to articulate notions of
policy relevant to the practice of international trade and commerce,
just as that practice has shaped the substantive rules themselves. Thus,
in one I.C.C. award, the arbitrator recognized as valid a contractual
provision guaranteeing the exchange rate as between the parties irre-
spective of its validity under the otherwise applicable law. Such
stipulations, according to the arbitrator, are to be encouraged and
upheld without reference to the prohibitions of national law. 40' Rea-
soning such as this may soundly be based on such sources of interna-
tional public law as the Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund,4°2 or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.4 3
Arbitrators should also develop more broadly based notions of policy
stemming from the basic ethical standards of international com-
400. Antco Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Sidemar S.p.A., 417 F. Supp. 207, 215 (1976).
401. Chronique, supra note 86, at 892.
402. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, done Dec. 27, 1945,
2 U.N.T.S. 185.
403. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Oct. 30, 1974, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
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merce, 40 4 as well as the deep seated judicial concepts of substantive
justice. In this way, through the institution of arbitration, policy
considerations will become less instruments of parochialism, and more
agents for the growth of international law.
404. In one case of current relevance, an arbitrator refused to permit recovery of a
commission for procuring a contract where bribery was necessary. See Lew, supra note
135, at 1I. Of course, any court would reach the same result.
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